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ABSTRACT

“As Vigilant as Argus”: A Military History of the Irish and Tejano Tories of the Texas
Revolution, 1835-1836 (May 2020)

Jonathan Lamar Woodward, Bachelor of Arts, University of West Florida;
Chair of Committee: Dr. Aaron Alejandro Olivas

This thesis analyzes the Irish and Tejano Tories of the Texas Revolution from a military
perspective. Emphasizing ideas of historical tradition and heritage, this work examines the Tories
as continuations of the Wild Geese, soldados de cuera, and compañías volantes. This is done
through an examination of Irish and Tejano Tory motivation in supporting Mexico and military
participation in the Texas Revolution. This work also examines ideas of economic opportunity,
social acceptance, personal conservatism, distrust of foreign settlement, and fear of invasion or
reprisal as factors in Toryism or loyalism. Militarily, this thesis examines Tory military roles
alongside Mexican forces as continuations of their historical predecessors. This work contributes
to Texas and borderlands history through its focus on the conduct of the Texas Revolution and
ideas of negotiable loyalty within a borderland.
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CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE TORIES

Though the Texas Revolution (1835-1836) became a war for independence, it did not begin
as such. The Revolution initially began as part of the centralist-federalist civil wars that Mexico
had engaged in since the 1820s, specifically as a federalist revolt to restore the Mexican
Constitution of 1824. This revolution only became a war of independence later in the conflict. And
like many civil wars and revolutions, not everyone within Texas supported the rebels. There
existed in Texas a portion of the population—both Anglo and Tejano—that supported neither
revolution or independence and supported the Mexican government, and were noted as being “as
vigilant as Argus” in their efforts.1 These loyalists or “Tories,” as the revolutionary faction
described them, decided to support the Mexican government for multiple reasons, with scholars
generally agreeing that no single factor caused Tory sentiment. As described by Texas Revolution
scholar Paul D. Lack, these factors ranged from regional disharmony to personality clashes,
contests for leadership, and ethnic tensions.2
This thesis is a military history of the Tories of the Texas Revolution, focusing on the Irish
Tories of San Patricio and the Tejano Tories of the Goliad-Lipantitlán area. It will first examine
how scholars have approached the Tories in their own work, highlighting how they have portrayed
these Tories and what they emphasized in their publications. This work will examine the factors
that likely motivated the Tories in their Toryism, focusing on the Irish Tories of San Patricio and

This thesis follows the model of The American Historical Review.
1
M. Hawkins to J.W. Robinson, Béxar, Jan. 24, 1836, in The Papers of Mirabeau B. Lamar, ed. Charles Adams
Gulick, Jr., Vol. 1 (Austin, TX: A.C. Baldwin & Sons, 1922), 307.
2
Paul D. Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience: A Political and Social History, 1835-1836 (College Station, TX:
Texas A&M University Press, 1992), 177.
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Tejano Tories of Goliad, San Antonio, and Laredo. This examination will cover a range of ideas
like social acceptance, economic opportunity, gratitude, and a sense of indebtedness as motivators
for Toryism. These will also cover ideas of personal conservatism, distrust of foreigners, and fear
of invasion or governmental reprisal. This work will then analyze the military participation of the
Tories alongside Mexican forces by detailing their engagement in several battles during the
Revolution. This will highlight Tory tactical and strategic contributions to the Mexican war effort
and examine how these contributions were continuations of historical military precedents by the
Tories.
It engages with new military history by arguing that the participation of Irish and Tejano
Tories alongside Mexican forces was a continuation of the tradition of the Irish Wild Geese and
the heritage of the Spanish soldado de cuera and compañía volante via their methods of war and
motivations for supporting

the Mexican government. Regarding old military history, an

examination of Tory tactical and strategic contributions to the Mexican war effort will be
conducted, focusing on physical warfare waged by the Tories. The Tories of the Texas Revolution
have gained some attention from scholars, but they remain a marginalized topic. By studying them
from a military context, this work hopes to shed light on their participation in the Texas Revolution
and illustrate how and why they fought alongside the Mexican forces in Texas.
Scholars of the Texas Revolution have evolved within the last thirty or so years regarding
their treatment of the Tories. Whereas scholars of the nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth often
ignored the Tories, recent scholarship has worked to include them in discussions of the Revolution.
This is part of a larger trend in scholarship focusing on the socio-cultural aspects of the Revolution.
This new approach has produced works focusing exclusively on Tejanos, women (both Anglo and
Tejano), African Americans, and slavery. Recent scholars have also attempted to produce less
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Texian-centric studies by presenting the Mexican perspective, writing works detailing the political
situation in Mexico during the 1830s, the experience of the Mexican Army in Texas, and Texas’s
place in the broader narrative of the Mexican civil war of the 1830s. The Tories are part of this
approach because as part of the population of Texas, they experienced each of these three factors
during the Texas Revolution. They were affected by Mexico’s political situation of civil war,
revolution, and governmental. Tories played a part in the experience of the Mexican Army in Texas
by aiding and abetting Mexican troops against the Texian rebels. Finally, they demonstrate the
place of Texas in the broader narrative of the Mexican civil war because they demonstrate that the
Texas Revolution took the form of a civil war that was affected by the broader conflict in Mexico.
When scholars of the Texas Revolution have approached the Tories in their work, they
have tended to focus on their motivations for supporting the Mexican government, and typically
from a socio-political or economic-political perspective. For Anglo Tories, scholars typically
emphasize their economic situation as key motivators for their Toryism, particularly those who
had prospered under Mexican taxation and land laws. Regarding Tejano Tories, scholars have
often emphasized their ethnic ties to Mexico and the tension that existed between Anglos and
Tejanos in Texas.
One of the foremost pieces of scholarship on the Tories is Margaret Swett Henson’s “Tory
Sentiment in Anglo-Texan Public Opinion, 1832-1836” (1986). She provides historical precedent
and documentation to the use of the term “Tory,” explaining that the term appears in Texas during
the Anahuac Disturbances, where William B. Travis derides the citizenry that supported Mexican
officials as “Tories and cowards.”3 Overall, Henson examines Tory sentiment amongst AngloTexians in the years preceding the Revolution and at the very beginning of the conflict. Henson

Margaret Swett Henson, “Tory Sentiment in Anglo-Texan Public Opinion 1832-1836,” The Southwestern Historical
Quarterly 1, Vol. 90 (June 1986): 1-34; 18.
3
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also examines what may have motivated these Tories to support the Mexican government as well
as their demographics. Henson argues that Anglo Tories (specifically those along the Trinity and
Brazos Rivers in East Texas) were generally older men who had settled in Texas before the 1830s,
including those who settled in Stephen F. Austin’s colony in the 1820s. These Tories also held
vested interests in land titles, many having prospered under the immigration laws, relatively low
taxation, and generous land grants the Mexican government gave to entice Anglo immigrants to
Texas. By contrast, members of the revolutionary faction were generally younger men who had
recently arrived in Texas shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, such as William Barret Travis.
Henson also contrasts their places of origin. According to Henson, the revolutionary faction tended
to originate from the former frontier settlements of the American South, whereas the Tories
generally were not. These southern newcomers possessed strong attitudes concerning individual
liberties that contributed to their revolutionary activity against the Mexican government when they
felt that their rights had been violated.4 Henson states that because of the Tories’ interests in land
and prosperity under the Mexican government, they supported Mexico during the Revolution for
economic reasons and not for political ideologies, such as a defense of their political rights as
Mexican citizens.5 Henson also explains that Tory military activity along the Trinity and Brazos
was extremely limited, with few if any Tories answering the call for militia on March 6, 1836.6
Henson even narrates two legends surrounding the Tories of the Trinity and the Brazos that
supposedly occurred in April 1836 during the San Jacinto Campaign. The first is the story of a
group of around twenty mounted Tories from the Trinity and Brazos settlements who appeared
atop a hill on the east bank of the San Jacinto River on April 20, the day before the Battle of San

Henson, “Tory Sentiment in Anglo-Texan Public Opinion,” 7.
Henson, “Tory Sentiment in Anglo-Texan Public Opinion,” 31.
6
Henson, “Tory Sentiment in Anglo-Texan Public Opinion,” 27.
4
5
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Jacinto. According to local legend, the men turned and fled upon seeing the Texian Army on the
west bank preparing for battle, with the hill being nicknamed “Tory Hill” because of this incident.
The second legend concerns a supposed list of around one hundred and fifty Tories that was
recovered from Santa Anna’s personal baggage following the Battle of San Jacinto. This story was
supplied by Lieutenant David L. Kokernot, a Texian officer who lead a company in the area of the
Trinity River and San Jacinto battleground to drive livestock from Tory homes. However, Henson
states that the list disappeared and that figures would likely have been much smaller than the stated
one hundred and fifty.7 Henson exemplifies the socio-political argument for Toryism as she
explicitly states that for Anglo Tories in East Texas, defense of their economic interests far
outweighed any political ideology.
Perhaps the most in-depth research on the Tories is found in Paul D. Lack’s The Texas
Revolutionary Experience: A Political and Social History, 1835-1836. Lack devotes an entire
chapter to both Anglo and Tejano Tories. Lack strictly defines Tory behavior as giving aid to the
centralist forces in Texas through military service and support. According to him, this support
represented only a relatively low percentage of the population in Texas. Lack also states that
military participation is the most effective means of discerning “genuine” Tory sentiment, based
on the assumption that areas that provided the lowest number of volunteers to the Texian forces
must have been populated mostly by Tories. Lack identifies the lower valleys of the Guadalupe,
San Antonio, and Nueces Rivers as areas with the lowest support for the Revolution, with these
municipalities providing less than fifty volunteers to the Texian Army.8 Of these areas, the greatest
Anglo military support likely came from the Irish colony of San Patricio. In November 1835, Irish
citizens from San Patricio fought alongside the Mexican Army at the Battle of Lipantitlán and

7
8

Henson, “Tory Sentiment in Anglo-Texan Public Opinion,” 26-27.
Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience, 156-157.
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provided intelligence to General José de Urrea during his campaign up the Texas coast in 1836.
These Irish informants were able to convince some of Urrea’s officers that the “war to the death”
strategy of Santa Anna was “stupid” and “ill-conceived.”9 The greatest Tejano military support
came from the lower San Antonio and Guadalupe River valleys, specifically the Goliad-Lipantitlán
area. Tejano Tories from this region provided intelligence to Mexican authorities, especially
through an intelligence network headed by Mexican officer Manuel Sabriego and formed irregular
militias that also aided Urrea’s campaign.
Lack also examines the possible motivations for the Tories, stating that factors included
ethnic tensions, regional disharmony, personality clashes, and contests for leadership.10 Another
possible factor includes that for much of the Revolution, the centralists forces seemed the most
likely to win. Thus for many Tories, particularly Tejanos, support for the Mexican government
seemed the most prudent response.11 Some Tejanos also feared the rising number of Anglos
settling in Texas and the demographic change that might occur should Texas become independent,
which would instantly make Tejanos a minority within the population.
Lack also provides some examples of the strategic and tactical contributions of the Tories
when they participated alongside the Mexican military. Aside from the Battles of Lipantitlán and
Coleto Creek, Lack gives descriptions of smaller engagements that the Tories participated in.
These include an attack on Refugio by the Victoriana Guardes in March 1836, which he states was
likely in retaliation for Texian assaults from February of that year. According to Lack, these Tories
plundered the town for two to three days. On March 10, 1836, Texian forces from Goliad under

9

Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience, 158.
Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience, 156. Lack gives examples of how Tory militias were organized, citing
the “Volunteers of the Nation” authorized by General Martín Perfecto de Cos in 1835, the Victoriana Guardes (a
guerrilla unit commanded by Carlos de la Garza), and a scouting company commanded by Guadalupe de los Santos.
11
Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience, 165.
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the command of A.B. King clashed with a force of around two hundred Tory guerillas near Refugio
before taking refuge in the town and requesting reinforcements.12 Texian reinforcements under
William Ward arrived three days later and engaged the Tories before King’s men barricaded
themselves in the town church to better withstand the Tory assault. The next day, March 14, the
Tories withdrew from Refugio and King’s men left to subsequently burn and loot the ranch of
Esteban López and other Tejano guerrilla leaders, reportedly killing eight Tejanos.13 When King
returned to Refugio on the evening of March 14, his men encountered both the Tory guerillas and
the bulk of Urrea’s army, which proceeded to capture King’s command on March 15. Lack states
that these Tejano guerrillas contributed to Urrea’s campaign by shielding his army with their
presence. The threat of their presence caused Fannin to divide his forces, which allowed Urrea to
defeat them in detail.14
Another work that examines Tory activity is Stephen L. Hardin’s Texian Iliad: A Military
History of the Texas Revolution. Throughout this book, Hardin generally refers to the Tories,
particularly the Tejanos who fought alongside Urrea, as “loyalists” (rather than the actual term
Tories), and notes that the Revolution was part of a larger Mexican civil war between centralists
and federalists.15 However, unlike Henson and Lack, Hardin does not examine the political or
economic situations of the Tories, nor does he discuss the possible motivations for their Toryism.
Hardin instead analyzes battles that Tories are documented as having participated in, providing
detailed tactical and strategic analyses of these engagements. Battles analyzed include the Battles
of Lipantitlán, where Irish Tories fought alongside Mexican troops, and Coleto Creek, where

12

Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience, 164.
Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience, 164.
14
Lack, The Texas Revolutionary Experience, 164.
15
Stephen L. Hardin, Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution (Austin, TX: University of Texas,
1994), 97. He does so by mentioning the federalist Zacatecas Revolt of 1835 and its suppression by Santa Anna, and
the desire for support from Mexican federalists that Texian leaders hoped for at the outset of the conflict before the
Revolution became an independence movement.
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Tejano rancheros fought as scouts and irregular cavalry as part of Urrea’s campaign. Hardin’s
analysis provides detailed information regarding Tory military participation, explaining how the
Irish Tories at Lipantitlán fought as infantry alongside dismounted Mexican cavalry, while the
Tejanos at Coleto Creek served as the Mexican scouts who encountered Colonel James W.
Fannin’s command attempting to leave Presidio La Bahia in Goliad. Hardin also emphasizes how
Mexican cavalry in general—and specifically the Tejano Tory auxiliaries—outclassed the Texian
cavalry in almost every engagement they participated in. Hardin credits these Tory irregulars with
providing Urrea with invaluable service as scouts owing to their knowledge of the area and as
cavalry due to their superb horsemanship combined with their skill with the lance and lasso.
Another work by Hardin detailing Tory involvement (specifically by Tejanos) is his
chapter “Efficient in the Cause” in Tejano Journey, 1770-1850. Hardin focuses on the military
participation of Tejanos in the Revolution, with a section devoted to Tory Tejanos. Here Hardin
refers to Tory Tejanos as “centralists” rather than Tories or even loyalists. This is likely to
distinguish them from Tejanos who supported the Revolution, whom Hardin refers to as
“federalists.” Hardin details Tejano Tory participation on campaign by citing Manuel Sabriego’s
intelligence network in the Goliad-Lipantitlán area and the Victoriana Guardes as main examples.
Hardin also examines the possible motivations of Tejano Tories, emphasizing factors such as: the
desire for federalism but not independence amongst some Tejanos; mistreatment of originally
neutral Tejanos by Texian troops, particularly volunteers from the US; and self-preservation. An
example of events that likely turned neutral Tejanos into Tories is the mistreatment of Tejanos in
the Goliad area by a unit of Texian volunteers authorized by Colonel James W. Fannin to root out
Tory sentiment. This company terrorized local Tejanos by invading their homes, earning them the
nickname “Mustangs” over the habit of kicking in doors and harassing inhabitants regardless of
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any professed allegiance to the Texian cause or federalist sentiment. This caused many Tejanos,
even those who had originally supported the federalist cause in Texas, to align themselves with
the Mexican government and support the Mexican Army through intelligence work or combat
support. Many of these Tejanos joined the intelligence network of Sabriego to operate within the
Goliad-Lipantitlán area and report on Texian movements to the Mexican military, or joined
companies of irregular horsemen like the Victoriana Guardes, which itself was likely based upon
the earlier compañía volante.
In “Efficient in the Cause,” Hardin examines the heritage of Tejanos, emphasizing their
descent from Spanish presidial cavalry known as soldados de cuera (or “leather jacket soldiers”)
stationed on the frontier during the colonial period, and the tradition of the compañía volante or
“flying company” for militia service against hostile Native Americans.16 Hardin also notes their
doctrine of “vatir y perseguir”—strike and pursue—as being borrowed from the mobile tactics of
Native warriors and the necessity of conducting offensive campaigns against them. This is
contrasted with the tactics of Anglos in Texas, with many coming from the southern US and
typically fought defensively against Native attacks, while Tejanos fought offensively by taking the
fight into their territory. Hardin explains that Tejano skill with lances, sword, and lassoes was
owed to the scarcity of firearms and gunpowder on the frontier which required presidial and militia
forces during the colonial and early Republic eras to rely on bladed weapons over firearms. He
credits these factors—alongside the ranchero culture of horsemanship—as producing a tough and
cunning trooper ideally suited for the nature of frontier warfare.17 Hardin also examines the favored
tactics of Tejano horsemen when serving in the compañía volante, such as lassoing an enemy,

Stephen L. Hardin, “Efficient in the Cause,” in Tejano Journey, 1770-1850, ed. Geraldo E. Poyo (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 1996), 50.
17
Hardin, “Efficient in the Cause,” 50-52.
16
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pulling them from the saddle and dragging them to their death. The lasso was a primary tool of the
ranchero and the frequent use of it in civilian life gave these men great skill that was deployed on
militia duty. Another example was the ranchero’s use of a cattle slaughtering tool known as a
desjarretadera, a half-moon shaped blade or luna attached to a pole measuring ten to twelve feet
in length.18 Rancheros would hold the tool under their right arm and ride up behind a cow to line
the blade up with the animal’s right hind leg. The ranchero would then flick the blade, severing
the tendon and dropping the animal to ground. The ranchero then dismounted and drove the blade
into the cow’s head, severing the spinal cord and killing the animal instantly. Rancheros also used
the desjarretadera to settle personal disputes, though a tradition lance replaced this tool when on
campaign.19 This use of the desjarretadera developed the dexterity that allowed the lance to become
a lethal primary weapon in the hands of Tejano horsemen.20
What Hardin does not do is elaborate on why the presidial troopers garrisoned the forts in
Texas, what they might have gained from their service, and what specific conditions caused the
lack of powder and shot that led to the Tejano use of lance, lasso, and sword. Hardin also does not
connect Tejano Tory participation in the Revolution alongside the Mexican Army as part of the
heritage of frontier service of the soldado de cuera not only in their tactics and weaponry, but in
their reasons or service. The soldados de cuera often enlisted in the presidial garrisons to gain
social status that was denied them in central New Spain owing to their mixed-race ethnicity.21
Regarding tactics, the Tejano Tories campaigned as light cavalry, lightly armed cavalry on smaller
horses best suited for scouting and skirmishing rather than shock actions like a full-tilt charge

Hardin, “Efficient in the Cause,” 50.
Hardin, “Efficient in the Cause,” 51.
20
Hardin, “Efficient in the Cause,” 51.
21
For an example, see Vladimir Guerrero’s “Caste, Race, and Class in Spanish California,” Southern California
Quarterly 92, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 1-18.
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against infantry, this being fulfilled by heavy cavalry (e.g. cuirassiers). European light cavalry
(examples being hussars, light dragoons and Cossacks) typically favored sabers, lances and pistols,
with soldadoes de cuera and Tejanos favoring the lance and the espada ancha, a short sword often
made by cutting down longer cavalry sabers. This work intends to fill this historiographical gap
by not only examining how Tejano Tory tactics continued the heritage of the soldado de cuera, but
also how their motivations for fighting alongside the Mexican Army continued the motivation of
gaining social status through frontier service. Lack and Hardin’s works exemplify the sociocultural argument through their examination of Tejano motivations for Toryism being possibly
influenced by fears of Anglo dominance, mistreatment by Texian troops, and desire for federalism
within Mexico and Texas over independence from Mexico.
A final piece that examines Tories is “Models of Migration: The Historiography of the Irish
Pioneers in South Texas” by Graham Davis. While this work is an examination of the larger
historiography of Irish-Texan settlers, Davis also examines the history of the colony of San
Patricio, which had a sizeable Tory population during the Revolution. Davis explains that the
Mexican government wanted Irish immigrants to settle in Texas because of their Catholic faith,
hostility to both the US and Great Britain, and their reputation as soldiers in Spanish service.22 The
Mexican government hoped that such a population would provide Mexico with dependable
soldiers on the frontier to defend its borders should war ever erupt with the US.23 Regarding
loyalty, Davis states that citizens of San Patricio were likely to remain loyal to Mexico because of
the generous land grants provided to the settlers and the friendly relations the Irish citizens enjoyed
with Tejanos and Mexican authorities.24 This friendliness was a result of the Catholic faith of Irish

Graham Davis, “Models of Migration: The Historiography of the Irish Pioneers in South Texas,” The Southwest
Historical Quarterly 99, no. 3 (January 1996): 326-348; 333.
23
Davis, “Models of Migration,” 326-348; 333.
24
Davis, “Models of Migration,” 334-335.
22
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and Tejano citizens of San Patricio, with some differences in practice, as well as cooperation within
local government between the two groups.25 Davis also states that the harsh conditions of life on
the frontier created a bond of friendship and that Irish settlers owed much of their survival to the
aid of Tejanos who taught these newcomers how to predict the weather, singe cactus so cattle may
eat it, and plant crops in Texas.26 The land that Irish citizens used for ranching had been given to
them by the Mexican government and the San Patricio citizenry had sworn loyalty to the
government as Mexican citizens.27 Given these factors, it is not surprising that the citizens of San
Patricio were likely to remain loyal to the Mexican government and fight alongside the Mexican
Army in the early stages of the Revolution, with Cos describing them as “los fieles Yrlandeses
vecinos de San Patricio” (the loyal Irish neighbors of San Patricio) in November 1835.28
What historians have generally not done is approach the Tories from the viewpoint of
military history. Some have produced works that partially approach the Tories from a military
perspective, such as Lack, though this typically only amounts to mentioning and describing battles
that Tories participated in. This approach is what is commonly called “old” military history, which
generally focuses on overall campaigns, battles, specific commanders, tactics, weapons, logistics
and organization, earning the nickname or “drum and trumpet” history.29 This can be contrasted
with “new” military history, which generally focuses on the interplay between society and the
armies that a society produces, while typically not being interested in combat.30 Hardin partially
engages with this new school of military history in “Efficient in the Cause” through his description
and examination of the Tejano ranchero culture and the effect it had on Tejano combatants, both
Davis, “Models of Migration,” 334-335.
Davis, “Models of Migration,” 335.
27
Davis, “Models of Migration,” 335.
28
Davis, “Models of Migration,” 335.
29
Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” The American Historical Review 112, no.
4, (October 2007): 1070-1090; 1070.
30
Citino, “Military Histories,” 1070.
25
26
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Tory and federalist. As stated earlier, Hardin emphatically states that the descent of many Tejanos
from Spanish presidial cavalry and the ranchero culture of Texas produced a trooper that was ideal
for mounted frontier warfare. Though Hardin mentions the Spanish descent of these Tejanos, he
does not elaborate on this subject in detail, rather he simply mentions that Tejanos descended from
these men and that the reliance on lances and lassoes resulted from the lack of firearms and shot
on the frontier.
Regarding Anglo Tories, specifically the Irish of San Patricio, scholars have generally
given little to any scholarly attention from a military perspective. On the rare occasions they do
discuss these Tories with a military perspective, it is typically only to describe the services
provided by Irish Tories to the Mexican Army (participation in the Battle of Lipantitlán and
providing intelligence to Urrea) and typically as part of larger works in which they are only
mentioned in passing. Little examination is given to the tradition of Irish service in foreign
militaries, specifically the famous “Wild Geese” of the Spanish and French militaries, or how the
participation of Irish Tories in the Texas Revolution was a continuation of this tradition. Wild
Geese were Irish exiles who joined foreign militaries, specifically Spain and France during the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and early-nineteenth centuries because of a shared Catholic faith, social
acceptance, and economic opportunity that was often unattainable in Ireland. Much economic
opportunity- specifically land ownership- was typically restricted to Protestants in Ireland,
particularly those of English and Scottish descent for much of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth
centuries, at the exclusion of Catholics. Because Catholics were the majority of the Irish
population, this effectively disenfranchised most of Ireland. A possible motivation for Toryism
amongst the San Patricio Irish was the shared Catholic faith with Mexicans and Tejanos, and the
land grants given to the citizens by the Mexican government. Wild Geese typically fought as
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infantry, as the San Patricio Tories at Lipantitlán did while fighting alongside Mexican forces, and
worked at gathering intelligence, as some San Patricio Tories supplied Urrea and his officers in
1836. The participation of the Irish Tories in the Texas Revolution was a continuation of the
tradition of the Wild Geese not only in their methods of warfare, but in their motivation for serving
a foreign government that rewarded them for doing so.
Another approach that scholars of the Texas Revolution and the Tories specifically have
not taken is to engage the subject within the field of borderlands history. Borderlands history is a
relatively new field that of study that focuses on the border between two nations. Popular areas in
borderlands history are the US-Mexico border and the US-Canadian border, particularly around
the area of the Great Lakes. Borderlands historians have established the idea that on a borderland,
loyalty was often driven by self-interest rather than national interest. For example, in his article
“Some Thoughts on Spanish East and West Florida as Borderlands,” James Cusick argues that
self-interest took precedent when deciding loyalty on the borderlands, with this interest pulling
individuals in different directions. Interestingly, Cusick focuses on Anglos in early nineteenthcentury Spanish Florida, but also draws parallels to nineteenth-century Texas (including a direct
reference to the city of Laredo).31 Cusick cites a study of Laredo’s citizen’s from 1755 to 1870 by
Gilberto Manuel Hinojosa in which Hinojosa states “Laredoans acted primarily out of concern for
their own best interests and only secondarily if at all to advance imperial or national goals.”32 The
Tories of the Revolution have not been included in the historiography of borderlands history
despite their representation of the idea of self-interest driven loyalty. The San Patricio Tories
possibly chose to side with the Mexican government because of the prosperity that many enjoyed
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under the lax taxation and immigration laws that enticed Anglo immigration to Texas, while the
Tejano Tories possibly maintained their loyalty to ensure Tejano dominance in Texas and push
back against the rising Anglo population, fearing a negative outcome should Anglos become the
majority. As such, the Tories fit into this historiographical theme be exemplifying the ideas of selfinterest driving loyalty.
Another idea of loyalty exhibited by the Tories that is pertinent to borderlands history is
the notion of loyalty being negotiable. This idea is that loyalty often changed depending upon the
situation and how individuals responded to this. This idea is exemplified by some Tories switching
sides during the Revolution. This often occurred amongst Tejanos when the Mexican government
offered clemency, or after mistreatment by Texian troops caused some to change from supporting
federalists to supporting centralists. An example given by Hardin is that of federalist Tejanos in
the Goliad area, who after being forced by Texian officer Phillip Dimmitt to perform manual labor
without pay, joined Manuel Sabriego’s intelligence network and provided information to Mexican
forces.33
Borderlands history also emphasizes the often-multi-ethnic nature of borders since
divisions between geography and culture are seldom clearly defined. This is the subject of Jeremy
Adelman and Steven Aron’s article “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and
the Peoples in between in North American History.” Adelman and Aron examine the relations
between differing ethnic groups, here focusing on the relations between whites (specifically British
and French) and Native Americans along the Great Lakes, and how imperial rivalry affected these
groups during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Examples include the French and Indian
War, the transfer of Canada from France to Great Britain, the fur trade (particularly the Hudson’s
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Bay Company), the Americans Revolution and the wars between Native Americans and the United
States along the Great Lakes. These rivalries, according to Adelman and Aron, led to the
development of international borders and solidified the divide between different groups along the
borderlands.34 The Texas Revolution fits into the historiography of borderlands history because of
the admixture of Anglo and Mexican cultures in Texas during the 1836s and how the Revolution
led to dispute over the Texas-Mexico border being either the Rio Grande or the Nueces River. The
Tories fit into borderlands historiography because of the multi-ethnic composition of the Tories
(Anglo, specifically Irish, and Tejano) and how they were part of a conflict that began as a civil
war to restore federalism in Mexico and transformed into a conflict for Texian independence. The
rivalry between Anglo-Texans and the Mexican government that eventually led to the creation of
the modern US-Mexico border along the Rio Grande.
Another relevant piece that deals with cross-cultural contact along borderlands is “On
Borderlands” by Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, where the authors emphasize how crosscultural relations along borders created bonds that subverted power from national centers.35
Hämäläinen and Truett argue that these relationships were able to subvert this power by operating
at scales too small for centralized powers to comprehend, control or contain.36 The Tories fit into
this theme but from the opposite approach: rather than subvert central power, the Tories aided it
through their support of the Mexican government by aiding the Mexican Army. This does not
disprove the notion that cross-cultural relations along borders could subvert central authority but

Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation States, and the People Caught
in between in North American History,” The American Historical Review 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 814-841; 815.
35
Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, “On Borderlands,” The Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (September
2011): 338-361; 348.
36
Hämäläinen and Truett, “On Borderlands,” 338-361; 348.
34

17

shows that it could aid it and illustrates that just because groups resided along borders, they were
not renegades by nature.
Aside from borderlands history, some scholars of the Texas Revolution fall into a
historiographic trap of not engaging with the Revolution as part of a larger civil war between
centralists and federalists in Mexico. When scholars have hit this pitfall, they typically view the
Revolution in a vacuum by focusing only on Texas and not bringing the Revolution into the larger
context of the federalist-centralist civil war. This is not to say that scholars of the Revolution do
not endeavor to view the Revolution in this larger context, as many indeed have. Examples already
given include Lack in The Texas Revolutionary Experience and Hardin in both Texian Iliad and
“Efficient in the Cause.” Hardin in particular is very sensitive to this trend, noting in Iliad that
many Texian leaders hoped for aid from Mexican federalists at the beginning of the conflict, and
in “Efficient in the Cause” he states that many federalist-turned Tory Tejanos began the conflict
in support of Mexican federalism, but could not abide when the war turned into war of Texian
independence. This sensitivity firmly places the Texas Revolution within the larger Mexican civil
war of the 1830s and is a historiography that this work seeks to continue.
Scholars have also engaged with the place of Texas and the policies of Mexico regarding
immigration to Texas in the years preceding the Revolution. They typically focus on the motivation
of the Mexican government for enticing immigration to Texas, what types of people were desired
by the Mexican government, and what measures were enacted to motivate immigrants to come to
Texas. An example is Nettie Lee Benson’s article “Texas as Viewed from Mexico, 1820-1834.”
Benson focuses on the discussions amongst Spanish and Mexican bureaucracies, particularly the
Committee on Foreign Relations, as to how Texas was to be populated. Benson emphasizes how
the Committee wanted to primarily recruit Mexican citizens and foreign immigrants, particularly
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European Anglos. Like Davis, Benson states that the Committee wanted Irish immigrants
specifically because of their reputation as soldiers, and the Mexican government’s desire to have
dependable soldiers along the frontier.37 She particularly focuses on the land grants and low
taxation offered to immigrants. This historiographical approach typically does not take into
consideration the impact of these policies on the motivations of individuals in Texas for supporting
or opposing the Revolution, nor does mention the Tories.
Another topic that scholars of Mexican history have approached is the role of Texas in
Mexican politics of the 1830s and 1840s. An example of this is Josefina Zoraida Vázquez’s “The
Texas Question in Mexican Politics, 1836-1845.” Vázquez primarily focuses on the role of Texas
in Mexican politics after the Revolution, such as the Mexican government’s refusal to recognize
Texian independence. She also illustrates the role of Texas in the centralist-federalists civil wars.
Vázquez emphasizes the original Texian goal of achieving federalism by preserving the
Constitution of 1824, and its relationship to the adoption of centralism by the Mexican government
as well as the rise of Santa Anna.38 Vázquez also illustrates the role of Texas in the years following
the Revolution, emphasizing Mexican refusal to recognize the newly independent Republic of
Texas, and ensuing conflict over the Texas-Mexico border during the 1840s. Vázquez ends the
piece with the annexation of Texas by the US in 1845, which was followed by the MexicanAmerican War. This school of historiography typically focuses on Mexican perceptions of the
Texas political situation from the Mexican perspective but does not typically mention any proMexican sentiment in Texas during the Revolution, specifically the Tories.

Nettie Lee Benson, “Texas as Viewed from Mexico,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly 90, no. 3 (January
1987): 219-291; 227.
38
Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, “The Texas Question in Mexican Politics, 1836-1845,” The Southwestern Historical
Quarterly 89, no. 3 (January 1986): 309-344; 311.
37

19

Another work on Texas’s in Mexican politics of the 1830s is Andrew J. Torget’s Seeds of
Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas Borderlands, 1800-1850. Torget
argues that the history of Texas during the early to mid-nineteenth century was part of a larger
history where the global cotton economy made northeastern Mexico the “western edge of the
American South.”39 Torget examines the history of Texas from 1800 to 1850, highlighting the role
of slavery throughout. Torget states that though Mexicans generally opposed slavery, the desire to
populate Texas with Anglo-American immigrants, many of whom were Southerners who brought
their slaves with them, led to an exception to anti-slavery laws passed by the government of
Coahuila y Tejas in the 1820s. Torget also claims that Tejano elites, like Juan Seguín’s family,
adopted slavery as a means of gaining economic prosperity for Texas.
Regarding the Texas Revolution, Torget states that slavery was the underlying cause of the
Revolution because of Mexican governmental hostility to slavery including the Guerrero
Proclamation of 1829, which outlawed slavery in Mexico, and Santa Anna’s renunciation of
federalism, which had allowed slavery to exist in Texas.40 The slavery-friendly Tejano elites
supported the Revolution because of their economic benefit from the system, which allowed a
plantation economy to take root in Texas through cotton planting. While the Tories are not
discussed in this work, Torget provides a unique perspective on Toryism through his examination
of slavery in Texas. The Irish and Tejano Tories likely owned few if any slaves, as they came from
cultures and regions of Texas that did not necessitate slave owning, as well as they likely lacked
the finances to purchase slaves. By examining this, Torget provides a framework for viewing the
Tories as also supporting Mexico out of a possible opposition to slavery.
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Scholars have also approached this era of Mexican history from a military perspective. A
relevant piece of scholarship on this topic is Pedro Santoni’s “A Fear of the People: The Civic
Militia of Mexico in 1845.” Santoni focuses on the militia’s minimal presence during the Spanish
colonial era in Mexico, how the militia was both disbanded and rebuilt during the 1830s after
filling the vacuum left by the Spanish, and the state of the militia in 1845.41 What Santoni does not
do however, is tie this topic into Texas and the Revolution. No mention is made of how Mexican
militia law was applied in Texas, how the order by Santa Anna’s centralist government to disband
the civil militia was a key moment preceding the Revolution, and how Tory forces may have used
their understanding of the militia system to form themselves into units for service alongside the
Mexican Army.
While the Tories of the Texas Revolution have attracted the limited attention of scholars,
they have not received a work devoted to them. Irish and Tejano Tories are an important piece of
the Revolution because their role illustrates the complications of the Revolution via their loyalty
to Mexico, illustrates how loyalty may be negotiable if a group may benefit from it, and how interethnic relations may help rather than hinder central power. Most importantly, the participation of
the Tories continued the tradition and heritage of the Wild Geese and soldados de cuera via their
motivations for their Toryism and their methods of warfare.
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CHAPTER 2
“IRISH PARTOZANS OF CENTRALISM”: THE SAN PATRICIO TORIES

Possibly the most well-known Tories of Northern European descent are the Irish settlers of
San Patricio. Located south of Goliad along the Nueces River, the colony was home to a prominent
Tory community during the Texas Revolution, with most of the citizenry and local government
supporting the Mexican government. The occurrence of Irish settlers supporting the Mexican
government raises questions over what motivated these Tories to do so. Was the Toryism of San
Patricio ideological? Did they support the policies of the Mexican government or favor a faction
in the Mexican civil wars of the 1830s? Or was their Toryism more pragmatic and driven by selfinterest? Taking the approach of borderlands history, where loyalty is viewed as negotiable and
influenced by factors like self-interest, it can be argued that the San Patricio Tories supported the
Mexican government because of the social acceptance granted to them by Mexicans and Tejanos,
in tandem with the economic opportunity in Texas that Mexican immigration policies and
Mexican-Irish relations afforded them. In turn, these created a sense of gratitude and indebtedness
that served as conditions that they were not willing to discard in favor of rebellion and may have
supported Mexico out of opposition to slavery. This combination of social acceptance and
economic opportunity as factors of determining loyalty—specifically to a foreign government—
also places the men of San Patricio in the historical tradition of Irish troops in foreign service.
From the Revolution’s outbreak in 1835, Texian officials were not only aware of the Tory
presence in San Patricio, but actively feared that they would support Mexican troops. This is
especially prevalent in the correspondence of Phillip Dimmitt, the Texian commandant of Presidio
La Bahía after its capture. As Dimmitt told Stephen F. Austin, “it is also rumored that the people
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of Sn. Patricio have joined the military at the Nueces.”42 Dimmitt later reiterated “we are informed
also, that, the population of San Patricio have almost unanimously joined the military,” in response
to the arrest of Texians John Williams and John Tool in San Patricio.43 Another revolutionary John
Linn stated “it is reported that the people of St. Patricio have joined the soldiers but it is generally
supposed that it was through necessity, they must of course be on the right side or they will belie
their countrymen.”44 Linn’s comments acknowledge the Tory sentiment of many San Patricio
Irish, but also defend their supposed enlistment into the Mexican forces, though current evidence
does not support any mass enlistment by San Patricio Tories.45 Mexican officials were also aware
of the San Patricio Tories, who General Martín Perfecto de Cos proclaimed “los fieles Yrlandeses
de Sn. Patricio.”46
To understand the rise of Toryism in San Patricio, the early history of the settlement must
be examined. The settlement of San Patricio was the brainchild of two Irish-born empresarios,
James McGloin and John McMullen. McGloin immigrated to the United States sometime in the
early nineteenth century, first through Baltimore, Maryland before settling in Savannah, Georgia.
By the 1820s, he moved to the Mexican port city of Matamoros.47 McGloin worked as a merchant
in Matamoros and it is through this business that he met McMullen. Both men learned the Spanish
language and by 1828 had formed a partnership to seek permission from the Mexican government
to establish an Irish colony in Texas as empresarios. As empresarios, the Mexican government
required McGloin and McMullen to recruit two hundred families for their colony and inform
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bureaucrats of their resources and business pursuits. Upon meeting these terms, the Mexican
government would designate the area of the colony.48 After attaining the requisite two hundred
families, empresarios were granted three haciendas and two labors (roughly 66,775 acres), but
would lose these lands if they were not cultivated and populated within twelve years. 49 Mexican
colonization laws allowed empresarios to provide the land for their colonists through the Mexican
government. To receive their land grants, colonists had to declare their intent to settle in Texas,
swear an oath to support the Mexican Constitution of 1824, and profess the Catholic faith (the
national religion of Mexico).50
Mexican colonization laws offered varying land grant sizes to induce immigrants into
Texas, with the sizes typically dependent on an immigrant’s marital status and if they paid their
own expense for their migration. Article 16 of the Colonization Law of Coahuila y Tejas stated
that single men or families who emigrated would receive one labor if they were farmers. Grazing
land would be added to the labor to create a sitio if they also raised livestock.51 If an immigrant’s
sole occupation was stock raising, they would receive a plot equal to 24 million square bars.52
Article 15 of the Colonization Law of Coahuila y Tejas promised unmarried men the same quantity
should they get married and an additional fourth of that quantity to immigrants who married nativeborn Mexicans.53 Unmarried men would only receive one-fourth of this value until they married.54
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Once they received their empresario grant from the Mexican government, McGloin and
McMullen were faced with the task of recruiting Irish colonists. To accomplish this, the
empresarios turned to Irish communities already established within the US. These communities
primarily existed in the northeast US in port cities such as New York City, where a sizeable Irish
community had developed in the early years of the nineteenth century.55 By the late 1820s, Irish
immigrant communities also existed in the south, in particular Kentucky and New Orleans, another
large port city with an incredibly diverse population.56 It was from these three areas that McGloin
and McMullen recruited their Irish colonists, who arrived in Texas from 1829 to 1836.57 Aside
from Irish colonists, McGloin and McMullen were able to recruit some Mexican and Spanish
families for their new colony, specifically Pedro de Oro, his wife, and children from Louisiana.58
With the recruitment of their colonists, McGloin and McMullen were able to establish their colony
with the permission of the Mexican government, which they christened San Patricio de Hibernia.59
Several factors likely motivated the colonists recruited by McGloin and McMullen to
migrate to Texas and their later Toryism. First, it is likely that these immigrants encountered
nativism based on anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant (particularly anti-Irish) sentiments—attitudes that
had begun to take hold in the US by the 1820s, particularly in large urban centers like New York.60
Irish immigrants also encountered a denial of economic opportunity, likely influenced by nativist
sentiments and manifested by the outright refusal to hire Irishmen for jobs in the US.61 In Ireland,
denial of economic opportunity took the form of a difficulty in acquiring land. Many of these
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Catholic immigrants were originally small farmers, laborers and displaced textile workers from
southern counties of Ireland, mainly Wexford, Cork, and Waterford. This Irishmen typically
occupied small plots owned by large landowners, typically Protestants of English and Scottish
descent. Many likely emigrated from Ireland because of industrial developments closing linen
mills, the expiration of leases causing the eviction of tenant laborers, and the failure of crops to
yield enough income to pay rent. High rents and low prices for goods like textiles and crops
provided incentive for emigration, while the possibility of economic advancement and generally
bettering their circumstances. A description of the Irish peasantry from Samuel Carter Hall’s book
Ireland: Its Scenery and Character illustrates their economic woes:
The general want of employment, and the consequent anxiety of obtaining for their
families the means of even temporary subsistence, produced such an eagerness on
the part of the peasantry to get possession of land, as to induce them to engage for
the payment of a rent, which the crops, even under the most favourable
circumstances, must have failed to yield. This circumstance was too frequently
taken advantage of; and the ultimate ruin of the miscalculating tenants was the
inevitable result.62
For landless Irishmen, the possibility of gaining their own lands in Texas was likely a powerful
motivator for emigration from their communities in the United States and their Toryism. Finally,
Irish immigrants were typically denied social acceptance in Ireland and the US, owing to their
Catholic faith and the fact that many of these immigrants likely spoke little English, as Irish Gaelic
was more commonly spoken by the Irish lower classes.63
Given these restrictive circumstances of life in the US and Ireland, Irish immigrants likely
saw life in Mexican Texas as an opportunity for economic opportunity via the promised lands
grants of the Mexican government, and a powerful motivation for Toryism. Likewise, it promised
a more hospitable community with Mexicans and Tejanos because of their shared Catholicism,
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and friendly feelings towards Irishmen held by the Mexican government, as evidenced by the
government’s desire for Irish immigrants in Texas.64 Following its independence from Spain in
1821, the Mexican government (here the Imperial government of Agustín Iturbide) decided that
populating Texas with either Anglo-Americans or Hispanic Mexicans was an important policy that
required governmental attention. To this end, the Mexican government formed the Committee on
Foreign Relations on September 30, 1821 with the intent of creating colonization laws for the
populating of Texas and Alta California.65 The committee drafted a series of suggestions for the
colonization of Texas, which was presented to the government on February 23, 1822. 66 The
committee recommended that colonists should be recruited from the United States, specifically
New Orleans, the poor population of central Mexico, and Europe.67 Regarding European settlers,
the committee recommended Irishmen as the most desirable settlers, owing to the shared Catholic
faith of Ireland and Mexico, the outstanding “moral value” (though no explanation was given for
this reason) of the Irish, their hard-working and industrious nature, their hostility to the United
States and Great Britain, and their reputation as soldiers.68 The committee hoped that by settling
Irish colonists in Texas, they could rely on soldiers famous for their valor and fierceness should
war break out with the United States.69
This long history of Irish soldiers in Hispanic service was likely what influenced the
committee in their desire for Irish settlers in Texas and may have influenced Toryism because of
why these soldiers fought. Irish soldiers had long served in foreign militaries since the late
sixteenth century, specifically in the Spanish and French monarchies. The earliest examples of
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Irish troops in Spanish service is found in the Spanish Army of Flanders during the Dutch Revolt,
with some as early as 1582.70 The most famous of the Irish troops in foreign service are the “Wild
Geese,” Irish soldiers of the Spanish and French armies who served from the late seventeenth
century to the early nineteenth century. Following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Irish Catholic
Jacobites (supporters of James II) left Ireland to join the Spanish and French armies, with their red
Jacobite uniforms becoming the mark of an Irishman in foreign service. Eighteenth-century Irish
officers in Spanish service included Hugo O’Conor, Alejandro O’Reilly, and Ambrosio
O’Higgins, all of whom became figures in Spanish colonial administration. Irish volunteers also
fought in several Latin American wars of independence, with Irish descendants like Bernardo
O’Higgins as key insurgents.
Like the San Patricio Tories, the Wild Geese and other Irish soldiers enlisted in the Spanish
military for social acceptance as well as economic opportunity. By joining the military of Spain, a
Catholic monarchy, Irish troops gained the social acceptance from their fellow soldiers and the
wider population of the Spanish empire and economic opportunity through their pay. Some
individual Irish soldiers, particularly officers, gained titles of nobility and additional wealth
because of their service.71 These historical precedents place the Tories within a military tradition
that they continued by supporting Mexico, as they gained the same benefits as their predecessors.
This historical interplay produces combatants that serve a foreign government for personal
economic benefit and social acceptance instead of purely ideological reasons. The generous
immigration policies of the Mexican government helped motivate the San Patricio Irish in their
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Toryism because it allowed them to finally experience what had long been denied them: the ability
to freely earn their own living without prejudice or fear of losing it all.
The San Patricio Tories may have also supported the Mexican government out of a sense
of genuine gratitude and indebtedness to Mexico. The Tories likely felt indebted to Mexico
because of the government’s generosity in land grants and the willingness of Mexican citizens to
help them prosper. Because of this generosity, the Tories likely felt a strong gratitude towards the
Mexican people and government. The Mexican government and people gave them the Tories the
life that had long been denied to them in Ireland and the US, and this was likely an easy factor to
forget. The San Patricio Tories may have also factored an opposition to slavery in their Toryism,
as evidence does not suggest that the San Patricio Irish did not own slaves. This is in contrast to
many Anglo-American immigrants into Texas, many of whom were Southerners that brought their
slaves with them. These American immigrants worked to gain Texas an exception for slave
ownership within the Mexican government, as they claimed their settlements would not prosper
without the institution.72 Given the lack of slavery in Ireland, the Mexican government may have
intended for San Patricio to serve as an Irish Catholic buffer against slavery in Texas and northern
Mexico, as they may have believed the Irish were unlikely to own slaves. The arrival of the Irish
to San Patricio in October 1829 roughly coincides with the Guerrero decree of September 1829,
when President Vicente Guerrero outlawed slavery throughout Mexico.73 Given their cultural
baggage of not practicing slavery and Mexican governmental action outlawing the practice, it is
possible that the San Patricio Tories supported Mexico out of a genuine opposition to slavery,
which many Anglo Texian and Tejano leaders fought to protect.
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San Patricio and the Tories were quickly drawn into the Mexican centralist-federalist civil
war of the 1830s. Under a federalist system, the state governments have greater power over their
own affairs than the central government, which in Mexico was relatively weak, a system codified
by the Constitution of 1824. Mexican liberals favored a federalist system and attempted to model
the 1824 Constitution on the United States Constitution. Mexican conservatives, in contrast,
advocated for a centralist government, where state governments are non-existent, and the central
government wields supreme power. Conservatives argued that federalism was unable to effectively
govern Mexico and led to lawlessness, disorder, high taxation and debt. In April 1833, Antonio
López de Santa Anna, the victor of the Battle of Tampico in 1829, was elected president as a
federalist. He switched political leanings to gain the support of conservatives when they sought to
regain control of the government, disbanded the militias, and dissolved the federalist Congress in
May 1834. In October 1835, the Constitution of 1824 was repealed and in December 1835 was
replaced with the Seven Laws (Siete Leyes), which effectively made Mexico a military dictatorship
with Santa Anna as dictator. The San Patricio Tories were drawn into the conflict soon after as
federalist opposition to Santa Anna began forming in Texas after the dissolution of the Constitution
of 1824. Though the citizens of San Patricio, and the Tories specifically, took no part in the
skirmish at Gonzáles in September 1835 or any resistance to Mexico up to that point, the
Revolution soon drew them into a larger conflict.
With the outbreak of the Texas Revolution the citizens of San Patricio were faced with the
dilemma choosing to support the Texian rebels or the Mexican government. The pro-Mexican Tory
population of San Patricio felt that as Mexican citizens they were indebted to the Mexican
government for their prosperity and owed it their gratitude, even if they personally supported
federalism and wished to return to that system. Those who supported the Texians—like Victoria
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resident and federalist John Linn—felt that Santa Anna’s government had become despotic and
necessitated revolt. As Linn stated, “We Irishmen know how to appreciate a despotic military
government.”74 The generous land grants given to the colonists allowed the citizens of San Patricio
to establish themselves as cattle ranchers, providing a livelihood and income that had largely
denied them in Ireland and the United States. Through this economic opportunity, the San Patricio
Irish were able to farm, raise livestock, and participate in commerce in Texas and the rest of
Mexico. Taking these opportunities into consideration, the Tories of San Patricio were unlikely to
risk supporting open rebellion against (and later independence from) Mexico.
A factor that may have influenced the loyalty of the San Patricio Tories was the length of
time before receiving their land grants.75 Most of the colonists in San Patricio received their land
grants in June 1835, likely causing many to view the centralist Mexican government favorably.76
This is contrasted with the colonists of Refugio, who received their grants before 1835, so that by
the outset of the Revolution their loyalty to the Mexican government was not tied to their land
ownership. The San Patricio Irish, and the Tories specifically, were likely incredibly grateful to
finally received their promised land grates, and this gratitude was likely on the minds with the
outbreak of the Revolution. Another key factor that likely influenced the San Patricio Tories’
loyalty was the interrelations between the Irish colonists and their Mexican neighbors. The
recruitment of Mexican colonists by McGloin and McMullen proved a boon to the colony because
they were able to teach the Irish how to survive in Texas. For example, the Mexican settlers taught
the Irish how to predict the local weather, and even singe cactus to allow cattle to eat it.77 The
knowledge passed on by the Mexican settlers allowed the Irish to integrate themselves into Texas
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ranching culture, which combined with the land grants allowed the Irish of San Patricio to prosper.
This style of agriculture may have also fostered an anti-slavery mindset when combined with Irish
tradition of non-slave ownership, as stock raising did not require slaves. This likely made the
Tories support Mexico because of Texian defense of slavery as a reason to revolt. The Tories likely
felt indebted to the Mexican government and people for their prosperity, as governmental policy
created the economic success and social acceptance they had long sought and wished to show their
gratitude in their Toryism.
Aside from the knowledge of ranching passed on by the Mexicans in San Patricio and the
shared rigors of frontier life, the Irish also enjoyed cooperation with their neighbors in sharing
local government and worship within the Catholic Church.78 The collective and individual
relations of the San Patricio Irish with their Mexican neighbors likely influenced their allegiances
because it possibly colored their view of all Mexicans. If those relations were positive, they would
be more likely to view Mexicans, Tejanos, and the Mexican government positively. As such, they
would be more likely to remain loyal to Mexico in the event of revolution. By contrast, federalist
Texian revolutionaries were unlikely to view the Mexican government favorably owing to disputes
over immigration, taxation and customs enforcement. This is best exemplified by the Anahuac
Disturbances of 1832, when centralist Col. Juan Davis Bradburn’s heavy-handed enforcement of
the anti-immigration Law of April 6, 1830 and tariff dues. Anahuac federalist, most of whom were
Anglo-American immigrants, revolted and drove centralist forces from Anahuac and East Texas.
Current evidence does not suggest that any such tensions existed in San Patricio before the
Revolution.
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Aside from their Mexican neighbors, the San Patricio Irish, and the Tories specifically,
also enjoyed cordial relations with military officials representing Mexico’s central government,
likely making them view said government favorably. The San Patricians particularly got along
with the garrison of the nearby fortress of Lipantitlán, as the soldiers could be seen on the streets
of San Patricio in 1835 without causing any alarm amongst the citizens.79 These troops may have
conducted business with the colonists by purchasing food and supplies, as soldiers in Texas often
had to feed themselves.80 This possible economic relation would likely ingratiate Mexican troops
to the San Patricio population, especially the Tories. Aside from the presence of troops in San
Patricio, the town’s leadership enjoyed friendly relations with the garrison’s officers. McGloin
enjoyed a friendship with Lieutenant Marcelino García, a popular junior officer amongst the
Lipantitlán garrison, while William O’Daugherty, the former alcalde of San Patricio and Tory
leader, was on friendly terms with the post’s commander, Capt. Nicolás Rodríguez. 81 The
Lipantitlán garrison also had the support of the Tory-controlled ayuntamiento, headed by
O’Daughterty’s successor Henry Thomas. The conservative Tory element of San Patricio were
prominent in the colony as late as November 1835, though many were indeed opposed to the
dangers posed by Santa Anna’s troops.82 The positive relations of the San Patricio Irish with their
Mexican neighbors provided the social acceptance that influenced Tory motivation in the colony.
Through the relations between the San Patricio Tories, their Mexican neighbors, central
government and troops is the borderlands idea of negotiable loyalty illustrated. The Tories felt that
they owed their prosperity to the Mexican government and were willing to support the government
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to maintain that prosperity. Even if they personally supported federalism, the centralists were
responsible for their land grants of June 1835 and centralist troops likely conducted business in
the town providing economic incentive for their loyalty. This shows how personal loyalty can be
negotiable if supporting a government or faction directly benefits an individual or community in
the case of the Tories. The positive relations with Mexican neighbors and government allowed the
Tories to prosper through land grants and ranching knowledge and provided a bargaining chip in
choosing their loyalty to Mexico. This relationship of the Irish Tories and Mexicans also
demonstrates another theme of borderlands history, that of multi-ethnic relations effecting central
power. Here, the multi-ethnic relationship between Irish Tories and Mexican citizens aided central
power instead of subverting it because it gave the Mexican government a population within Texas
that remained loyal to Mexico and actively supported the Mexican ear effort to suppress the
Revolution. This illustrates how these relations could aid central power when the right motivation
was in place instead of subverting it.
The Tories of San Patricio enjoyed effective control of the colony in the early days of the
Revolution. This changed following the Texian victory in the Battle of Lipantitlán (where at least
nine San Patricio Tories fought alongside Mexican troops) in November 1835, when the Tories
were effectively ousted from power and a federalist ayuntamiento was formed. The fear of the
Tories still loomed in Texian minds, as they still comprised a sizeable portion of the San Patricio
population. This is expressed in a letter of November 30 to Dimmitt from a Texian named John
Turner. Turner stated that the commandant of Lipantitlán (likely Capt. Nicolás Rodríguez) invited
the San Patricio citizens to join his ranks, and threatened vengeance against them if they refused.83
Dimmitt expressed this fear in a December 2nd letter to Henry Smith, describing another letter
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from Rodríguez to Susannah O’Daugherty, the wife of former Tory alcalde William O’Daugherty.
Dimmitt calls William the leader of the “Irish Partozans of Centralism” and requests that Susannah
now lead the Tory population after William was wounded in the Battle of Lipantitlán.84 Rodríguez
appears to have kept in contact with Susannah and other San Patricio Tories after Lipantitlán, as
another letter from Dimmitt to James Robinson of December 28 mentions a rumor that Rodríguez
met with the San Patricio population while coming to and from the town at his leisure.85
The Tories of San Patricio were motivated to support Mexico during the Texas Revolution
by self-interest through economic opportunity in conjunction with social acceptance, creating a
sense of gratitude and indebtedness amongst some of the San Patricio Irish, as well as a possible
opposition to slavery. The immigration policies and land grants of the Mexican government
allowed the San Patricians to gain economic opportunity in agriculture and stock raising, while the
social acceptance of the Mexican population fostered positive relations between Irish settlers and
their Mexican neighbors and government actors. Finally, the Tories’ support of a foreign
government for these economic and social factors places them in the historical tradition of the
Wild Geese, who joined the Spanish military for similar, if not identical reasons.
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CHAPTER 3
“WORTHY COUNTRYMEN”: TEJANO TORIES

Like the Irish of San Patricio, Tejanos were faced with the choice of supporting the
Mexican government or Texian rebels at the outset of the Revolution. The motivation of the Tejano
Tories likely varied amongst individuals. Tejano sentiment was divided, with some choosing to
remain loyal as Tories and others siding with the rebels. The Tejano Tories were likely motivated
by several factors or ideals, ranging from personal conservatism, distrust of Anglo settlers, possible
opposition to slavery, and fear of Texian invasion or Mexican governmental reprisal.
With the outbreak of the Texas Revolution in 1835, the Mexican government mobilized to
suppress the rebellion. This effort included the recruitment of Tory forces in Coahuila y Tejas and
other northern Mexican states, particularly Tamaulipas. In an official response to the revolution’s
outbreak (dated October 31), the government declared “bodies of militia are ordered to be raised,
[and] volunteers are to be called for.”86 In Texas, Tejano Tory leaders worked to organize Tejano
support for the Mexican government and raise militias to assist in suppressing the Texian rebellion.
Texian leaders obviously feared that Tejano Tories would support the Mexican troops by passing
intelligence or actively serving with Mexican forces. This caused some Texian leaders to distrust
even federalist Tejanos and fear Toryism amongst them. A Texian Military Affairs Committee
Report of December 6, 1835 accused Tejanos of deserting Texian forces to join the Mexican
forces “ with the intention of giving all the information in their possession to Genl. Cos.”87 Texian
governor Henry Smith warned Stephen F. Austin on December 17 that he was not to furnish
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supplies or troops for any Mexican (which possibly meant proclaimed federalists from northern or
central Mexico and likely included Tejanos) “who pretend to be our friends, such as [José Antonio]
Mexía and others, who profess to belong to the liberal party.”88 Smith’s words illustrate his distrust
of Mexicans, even those who profess to support the Revolution like Mexía, a known federalist.
Finally, Sam Houston echoed this belief in Tejano duplicity in a speech to the Texian garrison of
Goliad on January 15, 1836, where he stated:
Even many of the Mexicans who live between the Sabine and the Rio Grande have
disdainfully forsaken the cause of freedom, and have not only denied us their
support but united themselves with the troops of Santa Anna and as enemies waged
war against the land. Others have even gone beyond the Rio Grande to smother us
in conjunction with the next invasion. These, comrades, are for us the most
dangerous, because he who is not with us is against us.89
In the same speech, Houston issued a chilling warning concerning Tories:
Two different tribes on the same hunting ground will never get along together. The
tomahawk will ever fly and the scalping knife will never rest until the last of either
one tribe or the other is either destroyed or is a slave.90
The words of the Military Affairs Committee Report, Smith, and Houston show a clear message:
Tejanos are not to be trusted, that Tejanos will betray the Texian cause, and that Tories cannot
coexist alongside the Texians
A personally conservative nature likely influenced some Tejanos in their Toryism. One of
the most prominent Tejano Tory leaders was José Ángel Navarro, Tory leader of San Antonio de
Béxar and brother of Tejano federalist José Antonio Navarro. Born in 1784, Navarro served as a
royalist officer in the Mexican War of Independence and may have fought alongside the Spanish
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at the Battle of Medina in 1813, the bloodiest battle ever fought on Texas soil.91 Navarro remained
in Texas following Mexican Independence and worked in local politics, often cooperating with the
Mexican government regardless of its system: imperial, federalist, or centralist. This suggests that
he was less concerned with political ideology than expediency, preferring to benefit himself by
working alongside an established government. In 1835, Navarro was elected political chief of
Béxar. Apparently conservative by nature (evidenced by his Royalist service and cooperation with
subsequent cooperation with Mexican governments), Navarro aided the Mexican government at
the outset of the revolution, particularly the Inspector General of the Interior Provinces, Martín
Perfecto de Cos. On August 1, 1835, Navarro wrote to Cos and claimed that the people of Texas
were ready to support the central government against the colonists, unambiguously proclaiming
his Tory leanings.92 Cos arrived in Texas in September 1835, and by October had established his
headquarters at Béxar. Cos was keen to garner the support of the citizens of Béxar and the Texas
frontier settlements. Cos echoed this sentiment in an address to his troops on October 13, urging
his men to consider the Béxar Tories as “worthy countrymen” and to “rely upon their exertions to
support a cause which has become national and therefore common to all.”93Here, Cos encouraged
his troops to cooperate with Tory support for the Mexican war effort.
Cos obviously sought Navarro’s aid in garnering local support in his effort, as he wrote to
Navarro on October 17 and expressed his hope that the citizens would support the Mexican
government against the Texian colonists.94 Cos also wrote to Navarro to explain that several armed
citizens had come forward to volunteer their services “against the rebellious colonists.”95 Cos then
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ordered Navarro to organize these Béxar citizens into a company called the “Volunteers of the
Nation.”96 Navarro was also eager to support the central government and gather local Tories to do
so, as he wrote to Béxar resident José María Flores on October 18, instructing Flores to organize
a voluntary militia to combat the rebels, likely the volunteers that Cos ordered to be raised.97 It is
apparent that Tory sentiment and enthusiasm to volunteer existed in Béxar, as Navarro wrote to
Cos on October 20 and mentioned that citizens were interested in volunteering “for the defense of
the country.”98 To aid in recruitment, Cos authorized Navarro to promise these Tory volunteers
that they would “do battle with the citizens of the interior in this city only in case of an attack.”99
It is unknown if these volunteers were fully organized before the siege and subsequent storming
of Béxar from November to December 1835.
Cos was not the only Mexican general keen on gaining and maintaining Tory support in Texas.
Antonio López de Santa Anna also sought to maintain this support amongst Texas citizens, which
he made clear in a statement to the citizens of Béxar on March 7, 1836, the day after the Alamo
fell. The statement claimed that should inhabitants of Béxar or other settlements:
who should not appear to have been implicated in such iniquitous rebellion, shall
be respected in their persons and property, provided that they come forward and
report themselves to the commander of the troops within eight days after they
should arrive in a settlement.100
Santa Anna clearly promised that those who presented themselves to Mexican commanders would
see their property rights respected. This statement alone might have provided a powerful incentive
for Tejanos to be Tories, especially those of a conservative nature like Navarro.
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Men like José Ángel Navarro may have chosen to support the centralist Mexican
government out of a conservative temperament or a desire to maintain political power. As political
chief of Béxar, Navarro may have believed that the best way to maintain his position was to support
Mexico instead of the Texians. It is possible that he did not care for political ideals of federalism
versus centralism, as his royalist past and work with the Mexican federalist government suggest
that he preferred to cooperate with established governments instead of rebelling.
Other Tejano Tories may have been motivated by a distrust of Anglo settlers and other
foreigners. Perhaps the best-known and most active of the Tejano Tories was Carlos de la Garza.
Born at Presidio La Bahía in Goliad, De la Garza was the son of a presidial soldier and the
descendant of three generations of military men. As presidial troopers, his family fought armies of
rebels and filibusters in the early nineteenth century, which made De la Garza distrustful of
foreigners because of the rebellion and revolution they generally brought with them.101The best
known of these rebellions was the Gutierrez-Magee Expedition of 1813, an American led
filibustering expedition to wrest Texas from Spain. The expedition was brutally suppressed by
Spanish, Mexican and Tejano Royalists, and culminated in the Battle of Medina, the bloodiest
battle ever fought on Texas soil. For Tejanos of a military background like De la Garza, these
memories served as powerful motivators for their Toryism.
De la Garza also opposed the empresario colonies that brought many foreigners into Texas
and often marginalized Hispanics by effectively making them a minority within Texas and making
it difficult for Tejanos to gain their own land grants. De la Garza hoped to acquire his own ranch
after the mission land in Goliad was secularized, but instead the land was given to the empresarios
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James Power and James Hewetson by the state government of Coahuila y Tejas in June 1828.102
From 1828 to 1829, De la Garza and other Tejanos around Goliad petitioned the Mexican
government for their own land grants, but were ignored.103 From 1833 and 1834, Powers accepted
Tejano land petitions when he realized he could not recruit enough Irish colonists, and De la Garza
established his own ranch, Carlos Rancho, nine miles south of La Bahía along the San Antonio
River.104
De la Garza became involved with the Texas Revolution after Martín Perfecto de Cos
arrived in Texas in September 1835. Cos landed in Copano and was greeted by a Tejano Tory
delegation led by De la Garza, , which pledged its loyalty to Mexico. 105 Upon meeting Cos, De
la Garza offered to raise a Tory cavalry troop of local Tejanos and Karankawa Indians. 106 De la
Garza made good on his offer and raised such a company, which was christened the Victoriana
Guardes. Consisting of mounted Tejano Tories and possibly Karankawas, the company was
described as “well armed and well mounted”107 De la Garza and his Guardes joined the division
of General José Urrea in March 1836, where they acted a scouts and guerrilla cavalry during
Urrea’s campaign.108 These Tories were likely recruited from De la Garza’s neighbors, as many
Tejanos from the Goliad area fled to his ranch between November 1835 and March 1836.
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The reason for this exodus was the “great harshness” Goliad Tejanos received from Phillip
Dimmitt, the Texian commander of Presidio La Bahía.109 This abuse included requisitioning
private property without pay, slaughtering sheep without attempting to find the animal’s owner,
threatening to saw down doors, and forcing citizens to bring water in oxcarts for the Texians.110
Fleeing such abuse, Tejanos came to De la Garza’s ranch, which became a Tory safe-haven for
much of the Revolution.
Tories like Carlos de la Garza may have been distrustful of foreign immigration to Texas
and the effect on local Tejanos such immigration brought. These effects included marginalizing
Hispanics from land grants and empresario contracts and populating Texas with white immigrants.
De la Garza himself was likely motivated by a desire to protect his land grant that he was recently
awarded and those of other Tejanos. Tejanos motivated to protect these grants may have feared
that they would lose their land in the event of a Texian victory.
Like the Irish Tories of San Patricio, Tejano Tories might have taken a possible opposition
to slavery into consideration in determining their Toryism. Many Tejanos opposed slavery, but
Tejano elites embraced the system because of economic benefits and actively worked to support
slavery in Texas.111 These Tejanos hoped that through the introduction of slavery and cotton into
Texas would provide a robust economy and a stable population in the region.112 These Tejanos
were more likely to support the Texians at the Revolution’s outbreak in 1835. Tejano Tories, by
contrast, were unlikely to own slaves and more likely to support the policies of the Mexican
government in abolishing the practice. Like the Irish Tories, Tejano Tories came from a tradition
of non-slave owning, as slavery was not popular in the frontier of northern Mexico because of the
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agricultural methods of stock raising. Tejano Tories, particularly those from the Goliad area, were
engaged in cattle ranching which was not a feasible business for slave owning because it required
an unfree labor source. Like the Irish of San Patricio, current evidence does not suggest that the
Tejanos of Goliad, and the Tories specifically, did not own slaves or support slavery. Because of
these factors, Tejano Tories likely opposed slavery and supported the Mexican government’s antislavery policies, which they considered in their Toryism.
Tejano Tory desire to protect not only their fellow Tejanos from Texian abuse, but also
their land grants is similar to the desire of cuera troopers to earn land through military service.
Tejano Tories were a continuation of the heritage of the soldado de cuera because of their
motivation and methods of warfare. Soldados de cuera often earned their own land from the
Spanish government when mission land was secularized as a reward for their service. These cuera
troopers also protected the Hispanic frontier from foreign incursion, native attacks and rebellion.
By allying themselves with the Mexican government to protect their lands and the Tejano citizens
of the frontier, Tejano Tories like De la Garza continued the heritage of the soldado de cuera. Tory
use of irregular cavalry tactics alongside Mexican troops reflect the methods of cuera cavalry and
the compañías volantes, through their offensive patrols and possible use of improvised weapons
like lances and lassoes. Through their service alongside Mexican troops, Tejano Tories continued
the heritage of the cuera cavalry and proved that it was alive in 1830s Texas.
Tejanos were also motivated in their Toryism out of fear of Texian invasion, specifically
of northern Mexican states like Tamaulipas. Even before the official response by the central
government—and independent of the actions of Navarro and De la Garza—state officials in
northern Mexico attempted to recruit Tory forces and support. This is evident in a series of letters
from José Antonio Fernández, governor of Tamaulipas, to the ayuntamiento of Laredo. In the first
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letter, dated October 24, 1835, Fernández advises that the Laredo alcalde have the citizens defend
Laredo.113 This was likely in response to the Texian seizure of Presidio La Bahia in Goliad on
October 9. The seizure of Goliad removed one of the two largest Mexican army garrisons in
Texas—the other being San Antonio de Béxar. In his second letter, dated November 17, Fernández
instructs the Laredo ayuntamiento that soldiers have the right to ask for horses that are owned by
local rancheros to replace worn-out mounts.114 In the same letter, Fernández also specifies that
rancheros are obligated to give their horses to soldiers need of new horses.115 In Fernández’s third
letter of November 20, he instructs the ayuntamiento to give the citizens permission to possess
arms for their defense, possibly in response to the Texian victories at the battles of Concepción
and Lipantitlán.116
Fernández was likely interested in recruiting local forces in Laredo for two reasons. First,
Laredo was evidently a Tejano Tory city even before the outbreak of the Revolution, as a July 1,
1835 letter from Martín Perfecto de Cos attests. Cos, as Inspector General of the Interior Provinces,
acknowledged Laredo’s declaration of support to the central Mexican government.117 This
declaration was likely in response to the Anahuac Disturbances of June 1835 over customs
enforcement in Texas. Second, it is likely due to shortages of regular troops along the Rio Grande,
Texas, and other areas of northern Mexico. In May 1835, Fernández wrote to the Laredo
ayuntamiento, stating that the frontier towns must fortify themselves whenever troops are needed
elsewhere in Texas.118 Arms were apparently available in Laredo, as Francisco Lojero wrote in
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February that he was sending weapons for defense against Native Americans, as ordered by the
federalist Mexican government.119
Fernández was not the only Mexican figure interested in garnering Tory support in Laredo.
In October 1835 José María Guerra (a colonel of Mexican cavalry in Matamoros) warned the
alcalde to watch for weapons and supplies heading to Texas and informs the alcalde of the Texian
capture of Goliad.120 The Laredo alcalde was also warned to arm the farmers and ranchers of the
city in case of a possible Texian invasion of Tamaulipas.121 The citizens of Laredo apparently
followed these requests, as military comandante José Sánchez to the alcalde thanked the citizens
of Laredo for its loyalty and vigilance on November 14, and advised the alcalde on enemy
movements near Béxar.122 This was explicitly in response to the Texian siege of San Antonio de
Béxar which began on October 12, 1835. General Joaquín Ramírez y Sesma, Santa Anna’s chief
cavalry officer, also wanted the support of Laredo Tories. Sesma wrote the political chief (likely
the alcalde) on November 30, ordering that Laredoans gather supplies for 1,500 troops Sesma was
mustering.123 Sesma also informed the political chief that his troops should arrive by December 11
and would proceed immediately to Béxar, likely to break the siege and relieve the centralist
garrison under Cos.124
Another possible motivating factor was fear of reprisal should the revolt fail. Many people
in Texas, Tejanos and Anglos alike, were probably aware of Santa Anna’s brutal suppression of
the Zacatecas Revolt and feared a similar occurrence in Texas. Federalist governor Francisco
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García Salinas opposed Santa Anna’s order to dissolve the militia and mustered the Zacatecas
militia to oppose the centralists. Santa Anna personally led the regular army to subdue the
rebellion, defeating the federalist rebels in the Battle of Zacatecas in May 1835. As punishment
for the revolt, Santa Anna rewarded his victorious troops by allowing them to pillage the city of
Zacatecas for two days before returning to Mexico City.125Older Tejanos may have also
remembered General Joaquín de Arredondo’s reprisals after the Gutiérrez Magee Expedition’s
defeat in 1813. Arredondo executed anyone that was even thought to have supported the expedition
or any rebellion against Spain, which practically depopulated Texas. A young Santa Anna served
as an officer in Arredondo’s army and took note of the general’s methods Ironically, Arredondo’s
ruthlessness created the very depopulated Texas that the Mexican government sought to correct
with colonization and American immigration, which led to the Texas Revolution. Santa Anna used
Arredondo’s methods with impunity in his suppression of the Zacatecas Revolt and while working
to suppress the rebellion in Texas.
Like the Irish Tories, Tejano Tories illustrate the idea of the negotiability of loyalty. Aside
from ethnic ties to Mexico, Tejano Tories negotiated their loyalty by siding with the faction that
they felt could protect their best interest, here protecting land from foreign incursion by Texian
rebels and American volunteers and maintaining the political status quo in Texas. Their coinciding
loyalty with the San Patricio Irish Tories also illustrates that multi-ethnic relations may help a
central power rather than subvert, as both Tejanos and Irish Tories supported the Mexican war
effort by communicating with Mexican officials and fighting alongside Mexican troops.
Tejano Tories were motivated in their Toryism by a variety of factors that often varied
between individuals. Those like former Royalist José Ángel Navarro were motivated by a
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personally conservative nature that sought to maintain the status quo. Others like Carlos de la
Garza were motivated by a distrust of foreign settlement in Texas, which often marginalized
Tejanos because they made it difficult for Tejanos to acquire their own land grants, and often
brought revolution with them. Some Tories may have opposed slavery and the efforts of Texians
to expand the institution into Texas, and so supported Mexico to continue their opposition. Other
Tejano Tories were motivated by a fear of Texian invasion, like the people of Laredo who
organized Tory forces to guard against such an incursion. Finally, Tejano Tories feared reprisal by
the Mexican government should they support the Texians, likely remembering the brutal
suppression tactics of Arredondo and Santa Anna’s suppression of the Zacatecas Revolt. Whatever
their motivation, Tejano Tories sought to support Mexico and be counted as the worthy
countrymen that Gen. Cos believed them to be.

47

CHAPTER 4
“IMPORTANT SERVICES”: MILITARY PARTICIPATION OF THE TORIES

Military participation of the Tories during the Texas Revolution was limited when
compared to that of regular Mexican troops and even Texian rebels. Yet their presence on the
battlefield undoubtedly warranted unusual attention and even praise whenever they did so.
Mexican Zapador (Sapper) officer José Enrique de la Peña described Tory auxiliaries as rendering
“important services” to Mexican troops and claimed that the Mexican government would never be
able to adequately recompense the Tories.126 Aside from the political ramification of Toryism,
what makes these instances of Tory military action noteworthy is how they fought. Tories filled a
variety of military roles during the Revolution, including garrison troops, infantry, scouts, and
cavalry. Through their military roles during the Texas Revolution, specifically their tactical
contributions and methods of fighting, the Tories continued the historical tradition of the Wild
Geese that was couched in the Mexican militia laws that existed in Texas prior to the Revolution
in the case of the Irish, and the soldados de cuera and compañías volantes in the case of the
Tejanos.
The roles that Irish Tories played mirror the roles played by the Wild Geese in the Spanish
and French armies, specifically that of infantry, garrison troops, and cavalry. Most Wild Geese
served as infantry, fighting on foot in battle with musket and bayonet. Wild Geese infantry also
acted as garrison troops, manning fortifications throughout the Spanish and French Empires.
Examples of this include the Spanish infantry regiments of Hibernia (Hibernia) and Ultonia
(Ulster), who famously wore red uniforms in mimicry of the Jacobite roots of early Irish troops in
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foreign service.127 Hibernia served throughout the Spanish Empire, fighting in the 1781 Siege of
Pensacola and the 1812 Siege of Badajoz. Ultonia also served in the colonies and Peninsula,
garrisoning New Spain from 1768 to 1771 before returning to Spain, where the served alongside
the Hibernia and Irlanda (Ireland) regiments during the Peninsular War. Wild Geese cavalry
served in smaller numbers than the infantry, though one regiment is well-known: the French
cavalry regiment Fitzjames’s Horse. Raised in 1692 as a larger King’s Regiment of Horse, the
regiment served in the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, and
most famously at the Battle of Culloden in 1745, where seventy troopers served in the Jacobite
army. At Culloden, Fitzjames’s Horse was the only Jacobite cavalry to remain mounted during the
engagement but were badly mauled by British dragoons. A popular cavalry tactic of the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was to operate as mounted infantry or dragoons, using
horses to reach their destination before dismounting to fight.
Despite the well -known support for Mexico the colony, the San Patricio Tories played a
minor, but noteworthy role in the Texas Revolution, where they played the same military roles as
their Wild Geese forebearers. The Irish Tories of San Patricio are documented as only participating
in one action alongside the Mexican Army: The Battle of Lipantitlán. This battle occurred out a
desire of Texian leaders—particularly Goliad commandant Phillip Dimmitt—to capture the
centralist garrison at Fort Lipantitlán. The fort was located along the Nueces River just outside of
San Patricio, which likely comforted the local Tories with the presence of Mexican troops.
Dimmitt urged Stephen F. Austin to capture the fort because he believed it possessed artillery,
small arms, ammunition, and a “valuable caballada”—all supplies that the Texians desperately
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needed.128 The fort’s capture would also upset Tory control in San Patricio and allow federalists
within the colony to take power. These federalists would ensure San Patricio remained supportive
of the Texian cause, a vital strategic consideration given the town’s proximity to Goliad. In early
October 1835, Dimmitt sent two Irishmen, John Williams and John Tool, to San Patricio to contact
federalist leaders within the colony. The two were arrested by local Tories and turned over to
Mexican troops at Lipantitlán.129
With the capture of Williams and Tool, Dimmitt’s desire to capture Lipantitlán only grew.
Dimmitt also received information stating that two hundred Mexican dragoons were riding to
reinforce the garrison, with an additional two to three hundred cavalry from Matamoros behind
them.130 The alleged purpose of the Matamoros cavalry was to recapture Goliad.131 Convinced of
the importance of Lipantitlán, Dimmitt dispatched Ira Westover with thirty-five mounted riflemen
on October 31 with orders to capture the garrison. That same day, Captain Nicolás Rodríguez led
the bulk of the Mexican cavalry out of Lipantitlán to capture Goliad. Accompanying Rodríguez’s
cavalry were at least nine Tories from San Patricio, including the town’s alcalde, judge, and
sheriff.132 Westover’s detachment moved south and swept east to approach San Patricio, while
Rodríguez’s dragoons and Tory allies moved north towards Goliad. Additionally, Mexican
dragoons patrolled the Atascosito Road, a vital connection between Texas and central Mexico, just
north of San Patricio. Guided by Francisco de la Portilla, a local Tejano and brother-in-law of
Colonel James Power (one of Westover’s advisors), the Texians reached San Patricio shortly after
sundown on November 3. They soon learned of the garrison’s emptiness and sought to capture the
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fort as soon as possible. Realizing that many San Patricio citizens were Tories, Westover arrested
James O’Riley, whom Westover accused of “aiding and assisting the enemy.”133 O’Riley was
forced to accompany the Texians to Lipantitlán as prisoner, where he negotiated with Westover
for his freedom. O’Riley offered to convince the garrison to surrender if Westover would guarantee
his personal safety, to which Westover agreed. O’Riley approached the fort and made good on his
word, convincing the twenty-seven men within the garrison to surrender by eleven o’clock that
night.134 Amongst the captured garrison were a small number of Tories, five Irishmen, and one
Englishman from San Patricio.135 Of these Tories, Westover claimed that some joined the Mexican
garrison from choice, while others joined from compulsion.136
The captured Tories and centralist troops did not participate further in the campaign. The
Texians offered them generous parole terms upon their capture: they would be immediately
released if they swore not to take up arms for the remainder of the conflict.137 The Texians were
decidedly unimpressed with Lipantitlán once they occupied the fort. Irish federalist John Linn
described the fort as a “single embankment of earth” that was “lined within by fence-rails to hold
the dirt in place.”138 Linn’s apparent disgust was so great that he believed the fort was better suited
as a “second rate hog pen” than a military installation. The supposed arms held within the fort
were found to be lacking, consisting of “two four-pound cannon, eight ‘escopets’ or old Spanish
guns, and three or four pounds of powder; but no balls for the guns were discovered.”139 This
shows that the Tories and centralist troops at San Patricio, at least those within the garrison, were
woefully underequipped to fight the Texians. Westover’s men occupied San Patricio for the night,
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and on the morning of November 4 they burned several wooden huts around Lipantitlán and
partially dismantled the earthen embankment.140 Around three o’clock that afternoon, the Texians
prepared to return to Goliad by securing the two cannon, and rounding up fourteen of the “public
horses,” possibly from the Lipantitlán caballada.141 During the Texian occupation of San Patricio
and Lipantitlán, it does not appear that they had any conflict with local Tories other than those
captured from the garrison.142
While the Texians were preparing to withdraw from San Patricio, Rodríguez’s dragoons
and Tory auxiliaries were still heading north to Goliad. They had almost reached their destination
when a local informant of Captain Manuel Sabriego informed Rodríguez of the Texian capture of
Lipantitlán. Turning his force south, Rodríguez led his men back to San Patricio, where they
arrived at the outskirts of Lipantitlán around four o’clock in the afternoon of November 4.143
Fortunately for the Texians, Westover spotted the Mexican and Tory forces, and ordered his men
to prepare for battle. Westover ordered half of his riflemen to cross to the eastern bank of the
Nueces, where they took cover amongst a grove of trees.144 This was a preferred tactic of Texian
rifleman, because it allowed them to shield themselves and bring the accuracy of their long rifles
to bear, generally outclassing the musket-armed Mexican infantry. Realizing that his dragoons
could not operate as cavalry in a wooded area, Rodríguez ordered his dragoons and Tories to
dismount. The Tories and dragoons were then forced to attack the Texian position on foot.
Rodríguez deployed his men a single battle line, with the Tories on the Mexican left
flank.145 In his official report of the action to General Sam Houston, Westover gives a description
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of the Mexican and Tory movements: “the enemy came up in front and made a move from their
centre around our flanks on the river leaving a few men under cover of a mote in front. The enemy
on our right flank dismounted and took the advantage of the timber led on by nine of the Irish of
San Patricia [sic].”146 The Tories appear to have acted as guides and scouts, guiding the Mexican
dragoons through the timber along the western bank of the Nueces. It is apparent that Texians were
not entirely sure of the number of Tories that fought at Lipantitlán, with Westover’s report stating
that nine Tories participated, while A. H. Jones claims that twenty Tories fought with the
Mexicans.147 Regardless of exactly how many Tories were at Lipantitlán, it is clear that they were
in the middle of the action.
The Mexicans and Tories advanced to about two hundred yards from the Texian position
and opened fire, though this was ineffective because the smoothbore carbines carried by the
cavalry were woefully inaccurate at such a range. By contrast, the Texian long rifles were fully
capable at two hundred yards and inflicted severe casualties on the Mexicans and Tories. Jones
claimed that Texian riflemen killed three and wounded fourteen of the Mexican force, three of
which were Tories.148 Westover corroborated the number of Tories wounded, and both he and
Jones claimed the men were the judge, sheriff, and alcalde of San Patricio. The Tories and
Mexicans pressed their advance on the Texians but were forced to withdraw after a half hour
engagement. At dawn on November 5, Rodríguez sent a courier under a flag of truce to Westover
in San Patricio, requesting a truce and permission to bring the Mexican wounded into the town.
Westover agreed and the Mexican wounded, possibly including the Tories, made their way into
San Patricio.
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After burying his dead and treating his wounded, Rodríguez withdrew his dragoons to
Matamoros, leaving the Texians in possession of the town. The Tories who fought with Rodríguez
likely remained in San Patricio. Westover’s men withdrew from San Patricio and arrived at Goliad
on November 12. The Texians failed to leave a force within San Patricio to protect the federalists
amongst its population, which left the door open for the Tories to regain control of the local
government. Federalist John Turner claimed that Rodríguez had written to San Patricio leaders
and invited the town’s populace to join his ranks, promising the “vengeance of the Mexican army”
if they did not.149 Though evidence does not suggest any enlistment of San Patricio Tories in the
Mexican Army, it is likely that the Tories regained control of San Patricio by at least March 1836,
as the town was very welcoming to the division of General José de Urrea.150
Militarily, the San Patricio Tories played a small but distinguished role in the Lipantitlán
affair. They composed a relatively small portion of the Mexican force, with at least nine and
possibly twenty participating in the battle and six captured by the Texians in the garrison. It is
currently unknown what these Tories were armed with, possibly Brown Bess muskets or Paget
cavalry carbines, both surplus British weapons purchased by Mexico for its army. 151 The Tories
may have also carried privately owned firearms like hunting rifles and shotguns, as civilians in
Texas generally owned such weapons and early Mexican militia regulations called for men to
supply their own arms if available.152 How these Tories stand out is in their manner of fighting.
The Tories filled two roles in the Lipantitlán episode, those of garrison troops and mounted
infantry. By garrisoning the fort of Lipantitlán, the Tories acted as guards of the fort and town in
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case of a Texian attack. Those who rode and fought with Rodríguez acted as mounted infantry that
rode into battle and then dismounted to fight, a continuation of the classic dragoon tactic. On foot,
these Tories acted as infantry, likely skirmishers and guides for the dragoons as the moved through
the timber to engage the Texians. The Tories at Lipantitlán followed in the footsteps of their Wild
Geese predecessors in the roles as garrison troops, infantry, and cavalry—and continued the
tradition of the Wild Geese by doing so.
The Irish Tories’ participation at Lipantitlán also mirrors Mexican militia law, as these
Irishmen organized and fought as a civic militia. Generally, colonies in Texas were required by
Mexican law to form a militia upon the foundation of their settlements. This was generally in the
form of a civic militia, a locally raised and recruited force comprised of all male citizens between
the ages of 18 to 50.153 On August 3, 1822, the Mexican Congress passed a law to create a civic
militia that was essentially an almost word-for-word reprint of a similar decree of the Spanish
Cortes of October 14, 1820.154 Between 1822 and 1827, several Mexican states had implemented
the terms of the militia law, and as a result a militia that was not under national regulations arose
during this period.155
On December 29, 1827, the Mexican government passed a civic militia law that effectively
brought militia units under federal control.156 These regulations stated that the civic militia was to
consist of all male citizens of the states with officers elected from the local property-owning
populace.157 Militia law also allowed states to draw upon their own ordinances for their militias,
nominate their own inspectors and set up their own property qualifications for officers.158
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Regarding ordinance and weapons, this allowed states to issue weapons to their civic militias,
though regulations also stipulated that militiamen were to bring their own arms into service if they
possessed any, which was likely the norm for militias in Texas.159 The civic militia was also
intended to act as support arm for the regular army, and by 1835 the combined strength of the
Mexican army and active militia was estimated at 200,000 men, with 50,000 belonging to the
regular army and 150,000 in the active militia.160 The civic militia in 1835 was calculated as
800,000 men, bringing the entire Mexican military forces to around 2 million troops.161 The civic
militias was very popular in Texas, and it was Santa Anna’s dissolution on the militia in 1834 that
helped spark the Revolution, as the militia was a key means of defense for settlements on the Texas
frontier. The Tories of Lipantitlán likely organized themselves in a quasi-civic militia manner that
coincided with Mexican law, as they were locally organized, likely armed themselves with their
own firearms or borrowed from Mexican stores and acted as support for regular Mexican troops.
Like the Irish Tories and their Wild Geese predecessors, Tejano Tories possessed a rich
military heritage that they imitated while fighting alongside Mexican forces. Many Tejanos,
particularly those from the Goliad area like Carlos de la Garza, were the descendants of Spanish
cavalry that garrisoned the presidios (fortresses) that dotted the northern frontier of New Spain
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The duty of these cavalry was to protect the various
missions and settlements of the New Spain frontier from Native American attacks and foreign
incursion. These troopers were known as soldados de cuera or “leather-jacket soldier,” named for
a large, sleeveless buckskin coat worn as protection from native arrows. These troopers were
trained to fight from horseback and also fought on foot a the situation required, again as part of
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the dragoon tactic for cavalry.162 Another military tradition that Tejano Tories drew experience
from was the compañías volantes or “flying companies,” mounted militias that were responsible
for aiding the regular Spanish and later Mexican military in Texas and at times conducting
independent campaigns in the absence of regular forces. The compañías origins can be traced to
1713, when Spanish Viceroy Linares ordered frontier landowners of New Spain to organize “flying
companies” of militia to resist attacks by Native Americans, specifying that each company was to
number seventy mounted men.163
Further regulation of the compañías occurred with the Reglamento of 1772, which ordered
more formal organization of the companies by staffing them with local volunteers trained by
professional officers and calling for longer terms of duty through extensive campaigns.164 The
compañías volantes were likely a key factor in the organization of Carlos de la Garza’s Victoriana
Guardes, as they were a mounted force that conducted offensive patrols of Texian forces around
Goliad. Each cuera trooper was also to be heavily armed, with the 1772 Reglamento specifying
each soldier was to carry a flintlock escopeta (musket) or a carabina (“carbine”) with a shorter
barrel, making it easier to wield from horseback, and a brace of pistols that had barrels no longer
than ten inches and of the same caliber as the musket or carbine.165 Compañía volunteers were also
to be heavily armed, with regulations dictating each man to carry a carbine and two pistols.166
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Tejano Tories likely possessed similar firearms during the Texas Revolution, as they may have
been available in Texas in 1835.167
Alongside their firearms, cuera cavalrymen were regulated to carry a lance measuring eight
to nine feet in length, with a head measuring just over thirteen inches long, one and a half inches
wide, with a reinforced ridge along the spine, cutting edges on both sides, and a guard at its base.168
Finally, each trooper was to carry a sword like the broadsword-like cavalry swords of the Spanish
Army. Though these regular swords were issued and use by the cuera cavalry, another popular
sword in New Spain was the espada ancha or “broad sword,” a short sword with a broad blade
measuring about eighteen inches, often made by cutting down the blade of regular military
sword.169 The espada ancha’s short blade made it easier to wield from horseback than the regular
cavalry sword, becoming very popular amongst civilians. The espada ancha saw widespread use
among vaqueros and rancheros and was commonly used my mounted militias throughout New
Spain. These bladed weapons likely saw use amongst the Tejano Tories, as they would have been
available, and many Tejanos were familiar with their use.170 A favorite weapons combination of
the compañías was the lance and lasso, a skill gained from their work as rancheros. Skill with the
lance came from the desjarretadera, a tool with a ten to twelve-foot shaft and half-moon shaped
blade or luna, which was used in slaughtering cattle.171 The vaquero would tuck the tool under his
arm and ride behind a cow to position the blade against the rear leg of the animal, then flick his
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wrist to sever the tendon and cause the cow to drop to the ground.172 The vaquero then dismounted
and drove the luna into the cow’s head, severing the spinal cord and killing the animal.173 The
dexterity gained from using such a tool allowed compañía members to be effective lancers while
on campaign.174 Lassoes were a key piece of equipment for vaqueros, used in the wrangling of
cattle for branding and herding. On campaign, it proved an effective weapon in the hands of skilled
vaqueros, whose favored tactic was to lasso an enemy combatant, pull him from the saddle, and
drag him along the ground to his death.175 Mounted Tejano Tories may have been familiar with
this technique either through their own militia service or secondhand knowledge passed down from
other Tejanos.
Aside from the obvious influence of the Spanish military, the compañías volantes also
borrowed aspects of Native American military influence that was utilized by the Tejano Tories.
Tlaxcalan Indians of the Compañía Volante de San Carlos de Parras introduced the practice of
the caballada to the compañías sometime during the eighteenth century.176 The caballada was a
herd of horses that accompanied the compañía on campaign, with a designated ten horses per
man.177 As mentioned earlier, presidial cavalrymen were also issued multiple horses per man. This
allowed each compañía member to always have a fresh horse to continue their campaigns and
reduce the rigors of campaign on horses. It is possible that the Tejano Tories, specifically the
Victoriana Guardes may have continued the practice of the caballada when they campaigned
alongside Urrea’s division.178
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Compañía volantes also adopted a strategic and tactical outlook that was colored by their
experience with horse-born Native American warriors, specifically the Comanches. Rather than
retaliatory raids against native villages in response to aggression on Tejano settlements, the
compañías volantes were now required to maintain constant offensive patrols known as cortadas,
a duty they performed until the late 1820s.179 If a Comanche war party raided Tejano settlements,
the compañías volantes would mount an offensive counterstrike into Comanche territory. This
doctrine was known as vatir y perseguir or “strike and pursue.” Aside from their military duties of
patrolling and pursuing Native Americans, the compañías volantes also functioned as a sort of
mounted police force or gendarmerie. A specific example is that of the Laredo and San Antonio
de Béxar compañías, who during the late eighteenth century were made responsible for pursuing
criminals in the despoblado or unpopulated areas around the two cities.180 This tradition of
offensive patrols and aggressive strikes within enemy territory was likely the fighting style of
Tejano Tories like the Victoriana Guardes, evidenced by their raid of Refugio and their scouting
operations around Goliad.
In contrast to the relatively small military role played by the Irish Tories, Tejano Tories
participated in several military engagements of the Texas Revolution. Tejano Tories specifically
fought alongside the division of General José de Urrea as he conducted a campaign along the
southeastern Texas coast from February to April 1836. Urrea began his campaign by marching
north from Matamoros along the Atascosito Road. His main objective was to recapture the
fortification of Presidio La Bahía, then held by Texian under the command of Colonel James
Walker Fannin. Urrea was then to proceed north into the heart of the Anglo colonies in East Texas
and consolidate with the wing of the army commanded by Santa Anna. As Urrea proceeded north
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into Texas, he was joined by various Tejano Tories from the area surrounding Goliad and La Bahía.
After leaving Matamoros, Urrea was joined by Tejano Tory Don Salvador Cuéllar, the brother of
Mexican Army deserter Jesús Cuéllar, also known as “Comanche” because he had been a captive
of the tribe.181 Jesús was originally a sergeant in the Second Company of Flying Cavalry of
Tamaulipas who deserted to the Texians as they besieged Béxar in December 1835 and by March
1836 was serving with the Texian garrison of La Bahía.182 After Urrea captured San Patricio from
Texian troops on February 27, he remained in the town to drill his men. On the evening of March
7, Urrea was visited by Jesús Cuéllar, who announced his defection from the Texians and offered
to assist Urrea.183
Cuéllar told Urrea that Fannin’s Texians were moving to attack the Mexican forces at San
Patricio and offered to guide Urrea’s men to spot where they could ambush and easily defeat the
Texians.184 Cuéllar also swore that he had originally deserted to the Texians at Béxar “for the
purpose of better serving the government in the field of the enemy, convincing proof of which
would be the fulfillment of the promise he was making to us.”185 After Salvador vouched for his
brother’s sincerity, Urrea agreed to Cuéllar’s plan and departed San Patricio with two hundred
infantry, one hundred and fifty cavalry and one artillery piece on the morning of March 8.186
Cuéllar led Urrea’s troops to Arroyo de las Ratas, a wooded area along the road to Refugio Mission
roughly eight leagues (twenty-four miles) north of San Patricio, upon which he departed Urrea’s
forces.187 Finding the spot ill-suited for concealing his troops, Urrea departed the Arroyo around
midnight on March 8 and returned to San Patricio.
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On March 12, Urrea received Tory reinforcements that played a major role in his campaign.
That afternoon a group of thirty civilians from Goliad presented themselves to Urrea and offered
their services. Colonel Francisco Garay described these Tories as “well mounted and well armed,
under the command of a presidial (Mexican frontier cavalry) sergeant,” and General Vicente
Filísola claimed that these were Carlos de la Garza and his Victoriana Guardes, as well as several
soldiers of the company of La Bahía del Espiritu Santo.188 Filísola in particular singled out De la
Garza and the Victoriana Guardes for their subsequent role in the action at Refugio Mission two
days later, stating that they served in “a commendable way.” With the addition of these Tory
auxiliaries, who made excellent scouts because of their knowledge of the local terrain, Urrea took
the Guardes and six hundred men of his division north towards Refugio.189
Tejano Tories might have played a part in an important action of Urea’s campaign before
they arrived at Urrea’s camp. On March 2, Texian officers Dr. James Grant, Ruben Brown and
Plácido Benavides were driving a herd of several hundred horses with fifty-three mounted Texians
north towards San Patricio, unaware of the town’s capture by Urrea. Grant, Benavides and Brown
rode roughly a half mile ahead of the column and approached the crossing of Agua Dulce creek at
El Puerto de los Cuates de Agua Dulce, which sits roughly twenty-six miles south of San Patricio.
Unbeknownst to the Texians, one hundred and fifty Mexican troops, eighty cavalry and seventy
infantry, were under cover of two timber groves at the crossing, awaiting the opportunity to
ambush the Texians.190 Urrea was informed of the Texians’ position and route of march before the
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ambush, possibly be local Tories.191 The bulk of the Texian force reached the timber between ten
and eleven o’clock on the morning of March 2, at which point the Mexican cavalry attacked. Most
of the Texians were killed in the opening moments of the skirmish, either shot or lanced as they
attempted to flee.192 Five Texians dismounted and attempted to run, two of whom were killed by
the Mexican infantry and the rest escaped.
Grant, Benavides, and Brown turned their horses to join the Texians upon the initial attack,
but upon arrival quickly realized that the battle was lost. Brown had dismounted for an unknown
reason, though it is possible he did this to load his rifle, as long rifles were impractical on
horseback, or his horse was killed. Grant pulled Brown onto his own horse and rode away
alongside Benavides. Pursued by the Mexican cavalry, Brown shot a Mexican officer and the horse
herd stampeded. This pushed the cavalry aside and allowed the Texians an avenue of escape, as
they followed the herd. Galloping for roughly six or seven miles, the men fired their pistols at the
cavalry to keep them at a distance and refused to believe Mexican entreaties that they would be
spared if they surrendered. Grant ordered Benavides to gallop to Goliad and alert Fannin of Urrea’s
proximity to the area. Benavides obeyed and Mexican cavalrymen surrounded Grant and Brown
shortly after. Grant was lanced to death after he killed a Mexican who had pierced Brown’s arm
with a lance.193 Brown attempted to defend himself with a pistol and stolen lance but was lassoed
and pulled from the saddle. Brown was then taken to the site of the ambush as a prisoner. The use
of a lasso to subdue Brown suggests that Tejano Tories may have participated in the ambush at
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Agua Dulce, as lassoes were popular tools and weapons amongst Tejanos, but was not issued to
Mexican cavalry.
Tories also raided Refugio as they rode south to join Urrea. The Victoriana Guardes arrived
in the town on February 27, where four Tories visited the house of a Mrs. Foley. The four Tories
accosted Mrs. Foley and called for whiskey.194 The next day, the Guardes looted the town, which
Texian politician Lewis Ayers described in his journal. According to Ayers, the Tories opened
feather beds and scattered the feathers in the hopes of finding money.195 Seven armed Tories also
came to Ayers’ house, ostensibly with the intention to plunder the property and possibly to kill
Ayers.196 These Tories were driven away by Ayers and Horborn, after which the Tories withdrew
from Refugio and continued south towards Urrea.
As De la Garza’s Guardes departed Goliad to reconnoiter with Urrea and raid Refugio, the
Battle of Refugio was initiated by Tories and Texians near the Mission River. Twenty-eight
Texians under Captain Amon B. King had been dispatched from Goliad to Refugio to evacuate
Texian families in the area, likely a result of the previous Tory raid. Arriving at Refugio on March
12, King’s forces successfully gathered the families around the settlement, but delayed their return
to Goliad by attempting to harass local Tories. Hearing of a Tory encampment on the ranch of
Estevan López on the Mission River below Refugio, King’s men moved to engages these Tories.
The Texians found the ranch to have been abandoned, and likely frustrated at the loss of
opportunity to engage any Tories, burned it. This proved to be a fatal mistake, as the time taken to
conduct this punitive expedition gave Urrea’s cavalry, including Tories under De la Garza and De
los Santos, enough time to reach Refugio.197
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As King returned his forces to Refugio, he ran into the vanguard of Urrea’s cavalry and
was ambushed by De la Garza’s and De los Santos’s Tories on the outskirts of the town. Unable
to match the Tory and Mexican cavalry on the open prairie, King withdrew his men into the
Mission Nuestra Señora del Rosario and sent word to Fannin in Goliad to request reinforcements.
According to Ehrenberg, King described the besieging forces as “a band of one-hundred and fifty
Mexicans and Indians.”198 While taking cover within the mission, King’s riflemen could hold the
Tories and Mexican cavalry at bay. The Tories and cavalry then proceeded to besiege the mission,
likely to keep the Texians from escaping, and a task that would likely have required them to
dismount to perform. Fannin received King’s request for help and ordered Colonel William Ward’s
Georgia Battalion to assist their besieged comrades. Ward’s battalion arrived at Refugio around
three o’clock on March 14, where the two quarreled over who was in command of their forces.199
The Mexican forces retreated from the mission with the arrival of Ward’s men, with King deciding
to pursue the retreating adversaries while Ward moved to attack a supposed Tory ranch. Ward
heard reports of a small fort built by Mexicans and Karankawa Indians about five miles away from
Refugio, and he decided to locate this fort and destroy it.200 Finding no fortress, Ward returned to
Refugio and took up quarters in the mission.
As Ward returned to the mission, Mexican infantry under Garay and cavalry under Cpt.
Rafael Pretalia reinforced the Tories and cavalry around five o’clock, bringing artillery with
them.201 The Mexicans besieged the mission once again, shelling the church with artillery and
driving King’s forces out of a timber grove on the south bank of the Mission River.202 King’s men
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escaped and were pursued by thirty Tories, likely De la Garza’s men, and thirty six of them were
captured on the morning of March 15.203 The Tories brought the Texian prisoners back to Refugio,
where they were handed over to Urrea and subsequently executed.204 Garay intercepted a Texian
courier carrying a message from Fannin to Ward ordering him to abandon the mission and retreat
to Goliad, which Garay allowed the courier to deliver. Ward subsequently evacuated the mission
before dawn on March 16 and escaped.205 De la Garza’s men hunted Ward’s battalion on the plains
between Refugio and Goliad until Ward surrendered on March 22 and brought to Goliad under
guard after the Battle of Coleto Creek and occupation of La Bahía by Urrea.
After Agua Dulce, Urrea sent Tory scouts to reconnoiter Goliad and Presidio La Bahía,
though scouts were reported in that are as early as February 29. A scouting party of Tories and
Mexicans attacked a party of Texian pickets near La Bahía and drove the pickets into the presidio.
Tory scouts harassed the garrison at La Bahía for the remainder of March 1836, using the superior
horsemanship and knowledge of the terrain to great advantage. Texians within La Bahía
acknowledge this themselves, like volunteer John Duvall who claimed that “the greater portion of
the Mexican troops are mounted, and of course have greatly the advantage over us.”206 The Tories
seem to have favored a push-and-pull tactic while scouting Goliad preferring to remain out of the
reach of Texian infantry and taunting the Texian cavalry. Texian volunteer Abel Morgan described
this tactic in his account of the campaign:
The Mexicans have fled, and our brace little squad (of) horsemen pursued them.
When our men would turn around to come back the Mexicans would pursue them
until they would get within gunshot of our footmen, when they would turn around
and our men they pursue again. They kept alternatively chasing and being chased
until dusk when the Mexicans left. Our men retreated into the fort, all having
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escaped without injury. What damage was done to the Mexicans we never learned.
207

John Sowers Brook claimed that Tory scouts were so bold as to “frequently push up to our
walls” and that Texians were unable to pursue them “for want of horses.”208 Aside from this
aggressive, somewhat playful scouting and harassment, Tory horsemen played a vital role in
shielding Urrea’s advance towards Goliad and helping thin Fannin’s forces. By attacking Agua
Dulce and Refugio, Tories forced Fannin to disperse his forces away from Goliad, which allowed
Urrea to destroy these small forces in detail. This reduction of his forces was not lost on Fannin
nor was the threat posed by the Tories and Urrea. Fannin realized that Urrea was advancing
towards Goliad and that with his forces reduced by Tories and Urrea’s men, he could likely not
hold La Bahía, but did not withdraw. Fannin even rationalized his staying in Goliad on March 17,
acknowledging that Mexicans (likely Tories) were within sight of La Bahía roughly five miles
away, that he was preparing to resist “to the utmost” and the “for want of time” he had not
withdrawn from Goliad.209 Tory scouts continued to harass Fannin’s garrison until he finally
withdrew on the morning of March 19.
On the morning of March 19, Fannin used a morning fog and rain shower as cover to
evacuate his four hundred men force from the presidio, burning parts of the fort while retreating.
Tory scouts along the San Antonio River were unable to witness the evacuation because of the fog,
which lifted around late morning. Once the fog lifted, the Tories began to suspect that the Texians
had withdrawn from the presidio, likely seeing smoke from the fires meant to destroy the
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fortifications. The Tories were then able to approach the presidio without being attacked and one
even entered the presidio’s main compound.210 Once these Tories confirmed the Texian retreat,
they quickly reported this information to Urrea, who ordered eighty cavalry and three-hundred and
six infantry to pursues Fannin.211 Tories informed Urrea when they were the Texians, and at around
one o’clock the Tories and Mexican cavalry attacked Fannin and cut off his retreat on an open
plain a few miles away from Goliad.212 Realizing that his infantry was defenseless against cavalry
on the plains, Fannin had his infantry form square with the artillery at the corners. Urrea arrived
with his infantry around the same time, having them take cover in tall grass and behind timber
while the Texian square was in the open. The cavalry dismounted and advanced on foot before
firing a volley, then advancing again with the infantry. When the Mexicans got within one hundred
yards, Fannin ordered his men to fire. The combined small-arms and artillery halted the advance
and the cavalry remounted to engage on horseback. Several subsequent charges were halted by the
Texian fire, and Urrea ordered them to again dismount. The dismounted cavalry now joined the
infantry in sniping the Texian square for the remainder of the afternoon of March 19. Tory
participation is supported by Ehrenberg, who stated that
“300 Indians of the tribes of the Caranchuas and Lipans” were lying in the tall grass on the Texian
left towards the San Antonio River, where they wounded several Texians with rifle fire.213
The sniping by Tories and Mexicans killed the Texian draft animals, eliminating their
means of transporting artillery and wounded, killed nine and wounded forty, including Fannin
himself. The Texians remained in the square until the morning of March 20, when they realized
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that Urrea had received reinforcements of one-hundred infantry, two four-pounder artillery pieces,
and a howitzer.214 After the Mexican artillery fired a single salvo, Fannin raised a white flag to
discuss surrender. After negotiating with Urrea and his staff, Fannin agreed to surrender under the
condition that his men be treated as prisoners of war and not executed. The Texians were marched
back to Goliad and held as prisoners in La Bahía, while Urrea continued the march and took
Guadalupe Victoria on March 21. There he was joined by De la Garza’s Victoriana Guardes, who
captured the remnants of Ward’s battalion after they attempted to enter Victoria and flee to
Dimmitt’s Landing on the coast. De la Garza marched these prisoners to Goliad, where he
supposedly saved the lives of several of his Irish neighbors from Santa Anna’s order to execute
the prisoners.215 The Tories rejoined Urrea and served with him until April 1836, when news of
the Texian victory at the Battle of San Jacinto forced Urrea and the rest of the Mexican Army to
retreat south to the Rio Grande. The Tories subsequently followed the army and fled to Mexico or
returned to their homes, like De la Garza.
Tejano Tories continued the military heritage of the soldado de cuera and compañías
volantes while campaigning with Urrea’s division through their style of fighting and what they
likely used to do so. Their use of offensive patrols and aggressive scouting parties are reminiscent
of the compañías volantes, particularly their raid on Refugio and harassment of Fannin’s garrison
at La Bahía. Their tactical use as cavalry in combat mirrored that of the soldado de cuera, who
campaigned against Native Americans as cavalry, and their dismounted action was also like the
cuera cavalry, who received training on foot as well. These Tories were possibly armed with
lances, swords and other bladed weapons, as these were popular amongst Tejanos and Mexican
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cavalry, and were often relied upon by cuera troopers and compañías volunteers. The lassoing of
Brown at Agua Dulce supports the use of that tool as a weapon, again a common use amongst the
compañías volantes and other mounted militias. Firearms, if carried, were likely surplus British
arms used by the Mexican Army or privately-owned civilian weapons, possibly weapons left over
from the colonial era. These Tejano Tories campaigned like their predecessors in the soldados de
cuera and compañías volantes and showed that their heritage was alive in Texas in 1836.
The Irish and Tejanos continued the military tradition and heritage of their historical
predecessors while fighting alongside Mexican troops. Their roles as infantry, garrison troops,
cavalry and scouts mirrors the roles played by the Wild Geese, soldados de cuera, and compañías
volantes and placed the Tories firmly into their respective traditions. Though their efforts did not
ultimately ensure a Mexican victory in the Texas Revolution, the Tories military participation
provided a valiant contribution to the Mexican war effort, and simultaneously honored their
historical forebearers.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

A military history approach to the Tories of the Texas Revolution gives scholars a new
means to study a fascinating topic. Utilizing this approach, scholars may examine the economic,
cultural, religious and social dynamics of 1830s Texas, Mexico, Ireland, Great Britain and the
United States that motivated these people in their Toryism. Their motivation for Toryism differed
between individuals and even entire ethnic groups, from the Irish of San Patricio to the Tejanos of
Goliad, San Antonio de Béxar and Laredo. This ranged from social acceptance and economic
opportunity to a personal conservatism, distrust of foreign settlement in Texas, and fear of Texian
invasion of Mexico or Mexican governmental reprisal should the revolt fail. Scholars may also use
this approach to examine how the Tories’ military participation in the Revolution mirrored the
roles of their historical predecessors the Wild Geese, the soldados de cuera and the compañías
volantes, and continued the respective tradition and heritage of these predecessors. The Tories
filled a variety of military roles including garrison troops, infantry, cavalry (lancers and dragoons),
scouts and guerrilla forces that mirrored the fighting styles of their historical predecessors and
continued their military tradition. The Tories remain shrouded in relative mystery, but wherever
they participated they made their presence conspicuous, from the Battles of Lipantitlán and
Refugio to the operations around Goliad.
The Irish Tories of San Patricio were motivated in their Toryism by a combination of social
acceptance and economic opportunity. With most of these emigrants being Catholic tenant
farmers, laborers, and textile workers from southern Ireland, where peasant populations struggled
to earn a living, Texas may have seemed like a paradise on Earth. The generous land grants of the
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Mexican colonization laws allowed these Irishmen to gain large tracts of land for their own use,
something that had been denied them in Ireland by landlords and the inability to pay rent for
tenancies. This economic opportunity allowed these Irish immigrants, whom had largely been
denied this in Ireland because of land ownership laws and the US because of nativist refusal to
employ Irishmen to finally prosper, a factor that was likely a powerful motivator in their Toryism.
Aside from the ability to finally own their own land, the Irish Tories enjoyed friendly
relations with their Mexican neighbors, who taught them how to prosper on the Texas frontier.
Mexicans taught the Irish how to tend cattle, singe cacti for bovine fodder, predict the weather,
and generally to integrate into the Texas ranching culture. The Irish Tories also got along well with
Mexican government officials, who distinctly wanted Irish settlers in Texas as early as 1823
because of their Catholicism and fierce reputation as soldiers, and who awarded the Irish their land
grants in June 1835. The Irish Tories enjoyed cordial relations with the Mexican garrison of
Lipantitlán, who often visited the town of San Patricio (possibly to conduct business with the Irish)
and the garrison’s officers Cpt. Rodríguez and Lt. García enjoyed friendship with community
leaders like Tory former alcalde William O’Daugherty and empresario James McGloin. Finally,
the Tories practiced their Catholic faith openly with their Mexican neighbors, a far cry from the
preferred Protestantism of Britain and the anti-Catholic nativism they likely encountered in the
US. This social acceptance in tandem with economic opportunity motivated the Irish of San
Patricio in their Toryism, as it created a positive situation that they were unlikely to risk losing by
rebelling against Mexico. These motivations place these Irish Tories in the historical tradition of
the Wild Geese and other Irish troops in foreign service, as they joined the French and Spanish
militaries for similar, if not identical reasons.
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Militarily, the San Patricio Tories played identical roles to their Wild Geese predecessors
while serving alongside the Mexican Army. During the Lipantitlán episode, these Tories served as
garrison troops within the Lipantitlán fortress, rode alongside Mexican dragoons as cavalry, and
fought alongside them as infantry during the battle of Nueces Crossing (Lipantitlán). The Wild
Geese filled the same roles in the Spanish and French armies, with the Spanish infantry regiments
Hibernia and Ultonia serving as infantry in various actions around the world, as well as garrisoning
Spanish colonies like Mexico in the eighteenth century. In the French army, the Irish cavalry
regiment Fitzjames’s Horse served as both typical cavalry and mounted infantry (dragoons),
including at the Jacobite defeat of the Battle of Culloden in 1745.
Tejano Tories were motivated in their Toryism by several factors that often differed
between individuals. Some, like José Ángel Navarro, were motivated by a personally conservative
nature that sought to maintain the status quo by supporting the established government. These
Tejanos were not willing to risk the loss of their livelihoods by supporting the Texian rebels. Others
like Carlos de la Garza, the descendant of frontier presidial soldiers, were motivated in their
Toryism by a distrust of foreign settlement in Texas. These Tejanos distrusted these settlers
because the empresario contracts often marginalized Tejanos by making it difficult for them to
acquire their own land grants and granting land to Anglo immigrants. This helped create an influx
of Anglos that effectively made Tejanos a minority within Texas. Tories like De la Garza also
distrusted this settlement because they often brought rebellion and revolution into Texas, as had
occurred in 1813 with the Gutierrez-Magee expedition.
The Tories of Laredo were motivated to be Tories out of fear of Texian invasion of
Tamaulipas other areas of northern Mexico. They responded to Mexican governmental calls to
form militias to guard against any such incursion and worked to watch the roads into Texas for

73

any weapons heading to the rebels. Finally, Tejano Tories feared that should they support the rebels
and the revolt fail, that they would suffer retribution from the Mexican government. They likely
remembered Arredondo’s brutal suppression of the Gutierrez-Magee expedition and his
subsequent depopulation of Texas, which a young Santa Anna took note of. Santa Anna later used
similar tactics when suppressing the Zacatecas Revolt, allowing his soldiers three days to plunder,
rob, and rape with impunity in Zacatecas after defeating the federalist rebels.
When Tejano Tories fought alongside Mexican forces, they continued the heritage of the
soldado de cuera and the compañías volantes in their tactics and organization. Like the soldado de
cuera, Tejano Tories generally fought as frontier cavalry, fighting both mounted and dismounted
as the situation dictated. These Tories, particularly De la Garza’s Victoriana Guardes, borrowed
the tradition of the compañías volantes, fighting as a mounted “flying company” that operated as
light cavalry, guerrillas, and scouts alongside Spanish and Mexican forces. The preferred strategy
of these horsemen was vatir y perseguir (“strike and pursue”), which Troy horsemen demonstrated
around Refugio and Goliad. The push and pull strategy and superior horsemanship of Tejano
Tories allowed them to harass Texians around Goliad, generally outclassing Texian cavalry. These
Tories likely continued the practice of the caballada, keeping a horse herd with the company to
ensure that troopers always had fresh horses, a practice that cuera cavalry and compañías volantes
utilized. Tories also used similar weaponry to their predecessors, mainly lances, which both cuera
troopers and compañías volunteers used, often with great dexterity. Tejano vaqueros gained this
dexterity by slaughtering cattle with the desjarretadera, an employed it in the compañías volantes
with the lance. Tories also used lassoes, a popular weapon with the compañías volantes and
effective at unhorsing opponents, as demonstrated at Agua Dulce.
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The Tories also illustrate the borderlands history idea of negotiable loyalty, where personal
allegiance is driven by self-interest and often determined by what benefits the loyalist best. The
Irish Tories supported Mexico because of the economic boon provided to them by the Mexican
government, even if they recognized the danger of Santa Anna’s centralist regime. Some Tejano
Tories were loyal because they both distrusted and feared the loss of lands to foreign settlers and
believed the centralist Mexican government could protect them from this. The Tories also illustrate
the borderlands history ideal of multi-ethnic relations affecting central power, here aiding rather
than subverting that power. Irish and Tejano Tories joined in a multi-ethnic alliance with the
Mexican Army that fought the Texians in several battles, in many cases directly contributing to
the success of a campaign or engagement, like the Victoriana Guardes alongside Urrea’s division.
The Tories were heavily influenced by Mexican politics and history, specifically the San
Patricio Irish. The Irish Tories were positively affected by the policies of Mexico, which granted
them the social acceptance and economic opportunity that they desired in Ireland and the US. This
gave heavy personal motivation for their Toryism and encouraged them to support Mexico. The
Tories were also firm participants in the centralist-federalist civil war that engulfed Mexico in the
1830s. Irish and Tejanos fought alongside the centralist government that had previously suppressed
other federalist revolts, most famously in Zacatecas, and contributed to multiple Mexican victories
in the Revolution.
This is by no means the definitive work on the Tories, as there is much more to be done.
Future work may examine the fates of the Tories following the Revolution, specifically the Irish
of San Patricio. Some Tories are documented as to their fates, like Carlos de la Garza, who
remained at his ranch in Goliad and died in the 1870s.216 The Irish Tories appear to disappear from
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the historical record following the Revolution, though they may have fled into Mexico with the
retreating Mexican Army. Did they make such a journey? If so, where did they settle once in
Mexico? Did they form Irish communities in Mexico? Regarding Tejano Tories, did they remain
in Texas or migrate to Mexico after the Revolution? Did the Republic know of these Tories and
seek to persecute them for their Toryism? The Tory activity in Laredo may also gain scholarly
attention, examining how these Tories organized themselves and if they provided any aid to
Mexican forces like the Tories of Goliad. Did the Laredo Tories organize themselves like the
compañías volantes or did any Laredoans enlist in the Mexican Army? Future scholarly work can
examine and hopefully answer these and other questions that pertain to the Tories.
The Tories of the Texas occupy a unique place in military history. Motivated by economic
opportunity, social acceptance, gratitude and indebtedness, the Irish Tories of San Patricio cast
their lot with Mexico, supporting the government at the Revolution’s outset and fighting alongside
Mexican troops at the Battle of Lipantitlán. The Tejano Tories were motivated by conservatism,
distrust of foreign settlers, fear of Texian invasion or governmental reprisal, and supported Mexico
by raising local forces that supported Cos and Urrea in Texas. Both Irish and Tejano Tories
negotiated their loyalty to support Mexico and used their respective motive as bargaining tools in
their decision making. Using the same motivation and tactics as their predecessors, the Irish and
Tejano Tories continued the historical tradition and heritage of the Wild Geese, soldados de cuera
and compañías volantes, fighting as cavalry, infantry, garrison troops and scouts. They also
illustrate how a multi-ethnic relationship may aid rather than hinder a central power, and firmly
established themselves as part of the centralist-federalist civil war by fighting alongside a centralist
government. The Tories of the Texas Revolution may have only been a portion of the Mexican
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forces during the Revolution, but they left a distinguished trail for historians to follow, which this
present work has endeavored to do.
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